U.S. AIR FORCE RATED RETENTION PROBLEM: AN ANALYSIS THROUGH THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND AIRCREW CONCERNS REPORT

~~thesis~~ presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JAMES E. LITTLE, MAJ, USAF
B.A., University of North Carolina, 1966

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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During the period 1976 through 1979, the United States Air Force was adversely affected by excessive, unprogrammed voluntary separations by rated officer personnel. That situation produced a rated retention problem which threatened the combat capability of the force.

This study presents data, facts and an analysis of the rated retention problem within the United States Air Force, 1976 through 1979. An explanation of the nature and magnitude of the problem and consequences associated with the problem are identified. Through a report, "Conference on TAC Aircrew Concerns," the reasons for the problem are identified and analyzed. An appraisal of the problem is rendered using the psychological theories of Maslow, Maier and Herzberg. The conclusions identify the rated retention problem as extensive and complex; point out a solution that should stop the loss of rated personnel and change those factors which cause the retention problem.

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Approved by:

Joseph R Bream, Thesis Committee Chairman
MAJ JOSEPH R. BREAM, MA

Dennis A. DeFrain, Member, Consulting Faculty
MAJ DENNIS A. DeFRAIN, MS

Dr. Bradley R. Lear, LTC, Member, Graduate Faculty
LTC BRADLEY R. LEAR, PhD

Accepted this 11th day of June 1980 by Philip J. Brookes,
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

PROBLEM OVERVIEW

In December 1979, the United States Air Force was engulfed in a critical problem potentially as significant as any it had faced during its brief thirty-two year history. Retention of rated officers had declined far below the levels projected by the Air Force planners. Expertise and capability lost to the Air Force were significant and irretrievable. Future force projections painted a bleak picture for the 1980s. The following descriptions express the magnitude of that retention problem.

--Rated officer retention within the United States Air Force was far below the planned factor. The Air Force planned to retain 60 percent of its rated officers through their 11th year of service. Statistics for the period ending December 1979 indicated the retention was less than 30 percent. [1]

--Losses included higher percentages from the more experienced, more capable 6 to 11 year group rated officers. During Fiscal 1979, the Air Force lost nearly 3000 pilots; approximately 1800 were in the 6 to 11 year group. In June 1979 the cumulative separation rate of the crucial 6 to 11 year group was reported to be 73.1%, up from 56.2% in June 1978.[2] Prior to 1977, the rated officers who left the force normally possessed low officer effectiveness ratings. By 1979, large numbers of those officers who left the force possessed excellent ratings. [3]

--Future projections based on 1979 retention statistics indicated the Air Force would have insufficient rated officers to fill necessary requirements. Pilot shortages at the end of Fiscal Year 1979 was 1302 and projected to grow to 2100 by the end of FY 1980, 2800 by the end of FY 1981 and 3400 by the end of FY 1982. [4] If rated officer losses continued to increase at their 1979 average, the Air Force would have insufficient experienced pilots to fill available cockpits by 1982.

Rated officer retention in the Air Force at the close of the 1979 calendar year was a problem of significant magnitude. Insufficient numbers of rated officers were retained to meet force requirements. Experience and capability lost to the service were much greater than planned and were a primary result of increased losses among the 7 to 11 year group. The Air Force had been unable to reduce or stop its losses. Rated officer retention was bad and getting worse.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to increase the understanding of the United States Air Force rated retention problem. Toward that end, the author explores the magnitude and the consequences of the retention problem, identifies and analyzes the major causes for the problem, and postulates a solution.

RESEARCH METHODS

The research conducted for this thesis does not fit neatly into a traditional, single-purpose methodology. It should be categorized as a combination of methods that includes descriptive, historical,

statistical and survey methods.

Descriptive methodology -- "to describe relationships existing at a given time among phenomena by means of controlled observations without attempting to control or modify the phenomena themselves" [5] is used extensively by the author. Descriptions of the relationships and the phenomena which comprise the aircrew retention problem make major contributions to the research. Those descriptions use data from cumulative and diverse sources. Beginning in 1975, the author availed himself of every opportunity to observe and talk with contemporaries, younger officers and senior leaders whenever possible about rated officer dissatisfactions. He collected information from over twenty-four Tactical Air Force combat flying units, both active and reserve, within the continental United States. In October 1978 and again in December 1978, he participated in the TAC Aircrew Concerns Conferences I and II in an attempt to establish the core reasons for the rated retention problem. That background gives the author a sound foundation from which to use descriptive methodology.

There is a potential limitation to descriptive research. It is difficult to control the observations of phenomena without affecting the phenomena. It is impossible to record those observations without the perceptions of the observer becoming involved. Records of observations, or descriptive data, will always reflect the perceptions of the observer at some level. It is important, here, to insert this reminder for the reader.

If descriptive methodology includes that potential limitation, why then is it used? Institutional or organizational data collected

during the evolution of the retention problem was limited. There was no complete or accepted way to measure rated officer's emotions or dissatisfactions or states of mind, and little or no attempts were made prior to 1978. Descriptive methodology gives insight and dimensions to the aircrew retention problem which are not available from other sources. When used in conjunction with the TAC Aircrew Concerns report, descriptive methodology makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the situation and the problem.

Historical methodology--"arrangement of events in the past in a logical and coherent manner to reveal hitherto unrealized relationships..., with the requirement to interpret and evaluate" [6] is used. The time interval for this historical method is short, covering roughly ten years, and placing emphasis on the last two, 1978 and 1979. Sources include personal and official records, correspondence, published and unpublished material and extracts from other data pertinent to the retention problem.

Statistical methodology, or the results from statistical studies, will be found in the thesis. The primary source of the statistics is Air Force institutional data. The statistical studies and the sources will be identified throughout the test.

Survey methodology and content analysis of the survey are used in the thesis. Survey results were compiled by a Tactical Air Command aircrew Concerns Conference and are reproduced in Appendix A. [7] That survey, which is the actual end-of-action report from the conference, identifies what TAC aircrews believe are the reasons for the retention problem. Appraisal of the survey is conducted by content analysis. Statements reported by the aircrews are organized

under groupings viewed as major reasons. Those reasons are related to accepted psychological principles dealing with motivation and human needs.

LIMITATIONS

There are three limitations to this thesis. The data produced by the aircrew concerns survey is not scientifically pure. The survey is, in fact, an opinion poll produced by a group of individuals who were biased. That group was a stratified sample (not selected by a random or unbiased process) selected to "tell it like it is," to express their concerns, to report on their feelings. It is, however, perhaps the best and the most meaningful data available.

The method of analysis of the aircrew concerns survey, content analysis, is controversial. It does not produce indisputable conclusions. There is room for interpretation and subjectivity. However, reinforcement of that analysis through a relationship with accepted psychological theories will attempt to remove much of the controversy.

Descriptive methodology used in this thesis has those limitations mentioned earlier, but it is an indispensable tool.

CONDITIONS

There are conditions which should be identified and understood if the reader is to properly interpret this thesis. Rated officer retention within the United States Air Force was a problem at the close of 1979, not just an illusion or a condition. Proof is presented to validate that statement in Chapter II, but acceptance of that fact is basic.

The survey produced by the TAC aircrew concerns conference identifies the basic reasons for the retention problem and reflects the general concensus of rated officers Air Force wide. The results reported by that survey are almost identical to results reported by the Military Airlift Command, Strategic Air Command, Pacific Air Forces and by the United States Air Forces in Europe.[8] All reports were collected at different times, under different conditions, from different commands and from different aircrews; yet all essentially agree on the basic reasons. The TAC survey is used to report the reasons for the retention problem.

These conditions, then, should be identified and understood:
--rated officer retention was a significant problem at the end of 1979,
--the survey used in this thesis has been validated and reflects rated officer consensus of the reasons for the retention problem.

APPROACH

The approach to the thesis follows the presented outline. In the Introduction the author establishes a frame of reference for the reader; identifies the objectives of the study; recognizes the methods of research; explains conditions necessary to understand the thesis; outlines the work. In Chapter II he developes the magnitude of the problem; statistically reveals its significance; explores some consequences and implications and gives the reader a clearer understanding of the problem. The author identifies major reasons why aircrews get out; explains and clarifies the reasons given by the TAC aircrew concerns survey; discusses money as it relates to the retention problem; reports conditions and limitations associated with the TAC aircrew concerns conference and its report in Chapter III.

He evaluates the reasons why aircrews get out; expresses methods of analysis which improve understanding of the reasons reported; associates the reasons identified with accepted management and psychological theories in Chapter IV. A solution to the retention problem is presented by the author in Chapter V.

TERMS DEFINED

Retention: A dynamic term meaning the process of keeping possession of; the opposite of losing. For this paper, retention is associated with the number of rated officers retained by the United States Air Force (usually expressed in a percentage). Retention is that percentage of rated officers who do not separate from the Air Force. Retention rate is 60% for a given group means, six out of ten rated officers who belong to that group will remain on active duty; the correspondeing loss rate would be 40 percent. Retention and loss rates added together will equal 100% of the total.

Year Group: A contrived separation of Air Force personnel, used for research purposes, to facilitate the study of a problem. A year group may be defined in two ways: Individuals who enter the Air Force during a specific period of time, a calendar year for example; or individuals in the Air Force who are between a period of time in their career, say the beginning of their "X" year of service and the end of their "Y" year of service. A year group defined by the second definition will be a dynamic entity. The year group nomenclature will remain the same, but the individuals within that year group will change over time. Most probably, the characteristics of the group will change with the change of the individuals.

For the purpose of this study, the 6 to 11 year group will most often be identified. The reader should understand that the 6 to 11 year group includes those individuals who are between the beginning of their sixth year of service and the end of their eleventh year of service. It is important to identify and study the 6 to 11 year group of rated officers for the following reasons;

--this year group showed the largest relative change from 1977 to 1979,

--losses from this year group have the most dramatic effect upon the force; their experience is almost impossible to replace,

--this year group had historically shown the greatest stability prior to 1978.

Affected Group: A coined phrase used in this thesis to refer to all career officers who are affected by the retention problem. The group includes those rated officers who are denied some expected Air Force opportunity because of the problems imposed by low retention. It also includes those career officers, rated or non-rated, who experience an effect upon their career which can be attributed to the rated retention problem. The effects may take several forms, may be positive as well as negative, would include voluntary separation; individual, personal and family turmoil; loss of Professional Military Education (PME) opportunities; withdrawal from or denial of, rated supplement duties; loss of professional staff development; full tenure flying career, etc.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM

OVERVIEW

In 1979 the Air Force came to the full realization that rated retention and manpower were the most significant problems facing the organization. The rated retention problem had impact throughout the Air Force and there were many questions. What were the nature and the magnitude of the problem? How did it start? How bad was it? The author answers those questions and relates the genesis and history of the problem, statistically reveals the magnitude through December 1979 and discusses ramifications. He examines another view which suggests retention is not a problem.

GENESIS AND HISTORY

It may be impossible to identify a finite beginning for the rated retention problem within the United States Air Force, but, there is a genesis and history. While neither were positively documented or identified by military historians, both can be deduced from several sources. The most tangible of these sources are external indicators made obvious through written records and observations.

Early indicators began to surface by 1970. There was restive, restless behavior among the rated officers as they searched for identity and purpose. They began to indicate displeasure and dissatisfaction with many things previously accepted without question.[1] But these early indicators were perceived as adjustments to the Viet Nam draw-down, not as indicators of a potential rated retention

problem. It seemed obvious that individual unrest and personnel turmoil were natural effects of manpower draw-down after Viet Nam. [2] Nevertheless, unrest among the rated officer force began to appear and continued to grow throughout the end of the decade. That unrest was a first indicator of the rated retention problem.

By the 1977/1978 period, unrest within the Air Force rated officer ranks had solidified and projected itself through different media. Astute readers of the Air Force Times began to see indicators that dissatisfaction among the rated force was significant. Editorials from the rated force attracted attention with comments about working conditions, Air Force leadership, goals and missions and combat effectiveness. The Times recognized rated officer retention as a problem worthy of headline billing on 14 August, 1978. That issue ran the main-line story, "Air Force Battles Exodus of Pilots to Airlines," [3] to explain the mass exodus.

Other forms of descriptive communication were as readily available as the Times. The national TV media picked up the plight of the military as a general theme during the fall of 1978. Several syndicated stories projected the malady of rated officer retention within the military forces during prime time. [4] The "potential" problem received national TV coverage.

Within the Tactical Air Command, a unique media form surfaced. Out of the fighter aircrew frustrations came an unofficial publication entitled "Dear Boss, I Quit!" [5] It was a four page, open letter written by a pilot from Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada which included contemporary language, fighter pilot jargon and slang to "tell it like it was!" It recounted the situation in emotional terms and it exuded

the frustration and personal turmoil of the fighter force so well that it became a focal point for TAC aircrews. Never formally published or distributed, it was reproduced by every squadron in TAC and shown to the TAC commander himself.

Formal channels began to recognize rated retention as a problem by the 1976/78 period, Rated officers had begun to take the advice of the Washington bureaucracy and registered their complaints "with their feet." They began to leave the Air Force in significant numbers and losses were recognized by the Military Personnel Center at Randolph AFB, Texas and by affected MAJCOM headquarters. Statistics revealed that losses were much greater than forecasted and increasing rapidly.

In summary, the rated retention problem surfaced in 1970 as general unrest among the rated force. That unrest grew and produced indicators that confirmed the problem by 1978. Aircrews in large numbers left the service in 1977, 1978 and 1979. Those losses forced command level interest. By the end of 1979 efforts had been expended to understand the problem and reduce the losses; but, by and large, little more than problem identification had been accomplished. The development of the rated retention problem proceeded from unrest, to indicators, to aircrew losses, to formal acknowledgement of the problem by the command establishment.

STATISTICS AND GRAPHICS

Statistics and graphics can project the nature and magnitude of the rated retention problem more effectively than written words. This section verifies the facts presented in Chapter I. It presents data that illustrates the rated retention problem, provides a

statistical breakdown of losses for FY 79 and provides observations drawn from the statistics.

Historical retention rates for rated Air Force officers had been 59% for pilots and 49% for navigators. Those rates were the basis for force structuring, operational and contingency planning and manpower procurements. Since 1976 the retention rate for rated officers had steadily declined. Figure 1 is a graphic illustration of that decline using the 6 to 11 year group, pilot statistics. [6] Tables 1 and 2 provide a breakdown of the losses by percentage, by year group, for both the pilot and navigator respectively. [7] Facts and observations follow:

-Retention rate for the pilot force as of 31 December 1979 was less than half that planned by Air Force personnel guidance.

-A slight reversal of trends or leveling off, for pilots appeared during 1/Q 80. This was the first positive change registered since September 1976.

-Loss rates at the end of initial obligations (6 years) were relatively consistent. The 7 to 11 year group (pilots and navigators) indicated significant adverse trends.

-Loss rates were sustained below historical planning rates for over 50 months, and a rated shortage existed in 1979.

To illustrate the nature of the rated retention problem, an analysis of the data associated with rated losses for FY 79 is helpful. Table 3 depicts that data. The following observations



FIGURE 1. PILOT RETENTION RATES

TABLE 1. PILOT LOSS RATES BY TAFSC YEAR GROUPS

YR GP	SEP 76	SEP 77	SEP 78	SEP 79	DEC 79
6	30.7	30.6	31.0	32.7	31.6
7	16.3	13.8	19.3	22.8	22.4
8	5.4	6.9	13.8	19.3	17.9
9	2.7	4.7	8.9	20.1	18.7
10	2.8	5.1	5.5	13.7	13.6
11	2.5	4.9	4.0	11.0	10.2
6-11 AVG	49.4	52.1	60.4	74.3	72.5

TABLE 2. NAVIGATOR LOSS RATES BY TAFSC YEAR GROUP

YR GP	MAR 77	MAR 78	MAR 79	DEC 79
6	26.1	26.0	25.8	21.0
7	8.1	11.3	13.2	13.6
8	6.2	4.9	10.6	11.9
9	3.1	3.1	6.8	6.9
10	4.7	4.5	5.2	7.3
11	4.0	7.3	14.8	5.1
6-11 AVG	43.6	46.4	56.7	50.7

and facts provide enlightenment:

-Approximately 3000 pilots were lost in FY 79; the Air Force expected to lose 2000.

-Approximately 1800 pilots were lost from the 6-11 year group; more than 30% higher than expected.

-Voluntary retirements were up approximately 8% over FY 78. The average years of service at retirement had declined since FY 75; due in part to increased voluntary retirement.

From the statistical presentation of the rated officer retention problem, four points need to be reinforced. They are: (1) the total number of rated officers lost was well above that planned, (2) the trends indicated by the losses showed the Air Force did not have control of the retention problem, (3) the strength and shape of the force was altered, (4) there would be future impacts on the force.

RAMIFICATIONS

There are ramifications of the rated retention problem which must be addressed to fully understand the nature, scope and magnitude of the problem. They are intrinsic, somewhat intangible, include personal and organizational factors; are elusive and hard to quantify. All but fiscal costs cannot be adequately defined or documented by research and fall within the broader disciplines of management, psychology and "gut feel."

COSTS

To appreciate the fiscal impact of the rated retention problem

TABLE 3. RATED LOSSES FOR FY 79

	PILOT		NAV	
6 - 11 YEAR GROUPS	1801		410	
12 - 20 YEAR GROUPS	587		397	
OTHER YEAR GROUPS	550		336	
	2938		1143	
ATTRITION	89		35	
SEPARATIONS	1622		448	
END OF INITIAL OBLICATION		214		79
CAREER SEPARATION		1361		306
PROMOTION FAILURE (2X)		47		63
RETIREMENTS	837		565	
DISABILITY		18		9
VOLUNTARY		727		499
MANDATORY		34		11
PROMOTION FAILURE		58		46
PALACE CHASE	18		8	
7 DAY OPTION	269		37	
1X PROMOTION FAILURE	86		35	
OTHER	17		15	
GRAND TOTAL	2938		1143	

one must recognize the pressures on the American economy and fiscal mind-set during the period, must have an appreciation of the fiscal value associated with the losses, must understand the difficulties of replacement. In this section and the one entitled Replacement these three areas are discussed.

Two things were at work within the fiscal framework of the United States during the rated officer retention problem. One was increased pressures to change American fiscal expectations of the military. The other was a realization of the high cost of acquiring, maintaining and training a military force.

Reality for America in the 1970 decade included pressures to change traditional mind-set toward military fiscal policies. The military system after Vietnam had fallen into general public disfavor The draft had been abolished. Natural resources were severely restricted by inflation. Dependence on foreign oil restricted the economy. Costs for military training and technology had increased by staggering amounts. The time to mobilize and train prior to war had been severely decreased because of technological advances; a fact which made it necessary to bear increased military costs. All of these realities heightened public awareness and made the acquisition, maintenance and efficient management of the military a necessity.

The fiscal cost realized as a result of rated officers losses during the retention problem was significant. An explanation of the cost allows the reader to realize how significant and illustrates the high costs associated with maintaining a military force.

An exact derivation of the actual cost could be extracted only

with great difficulty. There were variables for each individual (such as source of commission, type and length of flight training, professional military education costs, and individual maintenance costs) which make extracting the cost arduous. However, a close approximation can be dervied by determining an average cost for the following;

--cost for acquisition and commissioning,

--cost of initial flight training (UPT, UNT),

--cost of weapons system training,

--cost of professional military education.

Figure 2 illustrates an estimate of the costs associated with one aircrew member within the 6 to 11 year group.

Acquisition/Commissioning	45,000
Initial Flight Training	235,000
Weapons Training	490,000
PME/Survival Training/ Simulator	30,000
COST PER INDIVIDUAL	$800,000

FIGURE 2. ESTIMATED COST OF LOSING A RATED OFFICER BETWEEN 6 AND 11 YEARS OF SERVICE [8]

By multiplying the shortage of rated officers (1302 by December 1979) times the cost per individual, a cost for the retention problem is approximated. A conservative approximation of the fiscal cost of the rated retention problem is over 1 BILLION dollars. Figure 3 illustrates.

COST PER INDIVIDUAL:	$800,000 TIMES (X)		
SHORTAGE OF RATED OFFICERS:	1979	1980	1981
	1,302	2,100	3,400
COST OF RATED RETENTION PROB-			
IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS:	$1.04 B	$1.68 B	$2.72 B

FIGURE 3. ESTIMATED FISCAL LOSSES ASSOCIATED WITH RATED RETENTION PROBLEM

The loss represented by the 1.04 BILLION dollar estimate was a staggering amount. A comparison of that amount and its equivalent purchasing power illustrates the magnitude of the loss. That amount would purchase 130,000 Chevrolet Monte Carlos; 2,080,000 color console televisions; 416 F-4 fighter aircraft; 69 F-15 fighter aircraft! The amount of money lost through December 1979 because of the rated retention problem would equip an entire wing with the most sophisticated fighter in the inventory. A tremendous, unexpected, irretrievable loss.

REPLACEMENT

Replacement of rated capability lost during the rated retention problem is a complicated process and will have significant impact on cost. To replace the rated officers and their expertise will require the expenditure of time and will be extremely expensive. But there are aspects of replacement that must be discussed before replacement cost can be addressed. An analogy will illustrate.

Equipment, tools and manpower can be acquired through short lead times. Auto industries can acquire molds for body production within a year. IBM copiers can be purchased off the shelves within hours or days. Manpower, unless it requires extensive technological training, can be acquired and productive within days or months. But trained doctors and skilled surgeons can only be replaced with time and experience and proper training. Replacement for a trained surgeon comes from two sources: one, the production line (that system of education, experience and practice which produce the skills needed); two, the pool of skilled surgeons already produced and available. Experienced Air Force rated officers are similar to doctors.

The analogy of surgeons and rated officers is somewhat dramatic, but it illustrates two very important points. The first, it takes time, experience and proper training to produce a professional rated military officer. An experienced pilot, even by the reduced standards used in 1979, requires four years of training; a skilled, highly proficient strategic or fighter pilot requires 6 to 10 years of training and experience. The second, replacement through the production line or from the pool of reserves is difficult. The supply from the production line is not adequate for the demand; the pool of reserve is limited and unaccessable except during war.

During 1979/1980, the United States Air Force could not replace its rated losses without the expenditure of time. It could buy an F-15 fighter aircraft with 15 million dollars, but it could not replace an experienced rated officer--fighter, bomber, instructor or weapons graduate--for any amount of money without time to train

and experience that individual.

Time to acquire and difficulty of replacement impact upon cost. Both will increase replacement cost in the future. The losses indicated in Figure 3 will be substantially higher because known factors will increase sub-costs. Time and inflation will drive costs up. Inflation at the 10% per year rate will add 50-75% to replacement costs in 5 to 7 years. Increases in training costs may be even more substantial. An example, the cost for the initial weapons training in the F-4 aircraft using 1978 estimates was $560,000. The same level of training for a pilot of the F-15 aircraft is estimated at $1,020,000 dollars.[9] Training costs for other weapons systems may not increase as dramatically as those for the fighter force, but all will be significantly higher. Projections of the dollar cost for individual replacement can double in the near future because of inflation and increased training costs.

Another aspect that will increase replacements costs is the Air Force retention rate. If that rate remains at 30% through the eleventh year of service, it will increase the replacement costs by a factor of three. To retain one rated officer past the eleventh year, three will have to complete training and enter the sixth year of service. For every one rated officer needed, three will have to be trained and maintained for at least six years.

To summarize cost and replacement, the value of the Air Force loss associated with the rated retention problem was conservatively estimated at over one BILLION dollars through FY 79. Replacement for that lost capability can only be acquired through the expenditure of time. Cost of replacement can be five times the original cost.

MORALE

Morale was a significant factor in the rated retention problem that was negatively affected; was intangible and extremely hard to statistically measure or quantify.

There is an accepted fact surrounding all United States Air Force aircrews and one which emphatically impacts on combat capability. Call it morale, ego or self esteem, all rated officers possess a high psychological feeling of self worth. Each one has a very strong can-do, positive attitude and belief in self. Psychological profiles point to aggression, achievement, esteem and ego as necessary ingredients for success or entry into the rated field. Fighter pilots are often used as examples of this phenomena. Each one, to a man, will look you square in the eye and tell you that he is the world's greatest fighter pilot. His rhetoric is not just blind faith or idle boast. Within that man's mind, he is convinced that he is as good as, if not better, than the man he will fight today or tomorrow. If that conviction is lowered, individually or collectively, the combat capability of the force is lowered.

Morale is an important factor in that psychological feeling and bears a direct relationship to the ability, capability and status of the rated force. As observed by the author and confirmed by the TAC aircrew report, individuals within the rated force at the end of 1979 had experienced one, or a combination, of the following feelings which negatively affected morale. They had observed some of the best, most capable men leave the Air Force. They had experienced a feeling that their peers had left them behind. They had felt the need to continue an adequate level of capability with reduced manpower;

were frustration that the organization could not correct the manpower shortage. They felt despair over the organization's inability to stop the losses. In general, they felt a concern that their Air Force might become a second rate force if it could not retain its talent, and a frustration that they, themselves, were unable or unwilling to stem that flow of talent.

All of these emotions, feelings, frustrations and concerns combined to lower the morale of the Air Force in 1979. What was surprising was the fact that morale, low by most U.S. standards, was not at a point of non-productivity.

LEADERSHIP

Leadership was negatively affected by the rated retention problem. Two aspects of leadership are considered here: the perception of the leadership during the period; the future effects on Air Force leadership.

Perceptions of the leadership varied between two significant groups, caused the retention rate to decline, and caused leaders to be less effective. The 6 to 11 year group of rated officers, perceived the leadership with mistrust and uncertainty. According to data from the TAC survey, they believed the leadership was inept; that it did not manage the force efficiently nor lead it effectively. They could not see positive leadership efforts to correct injustices.

The leaders perceived the problem of leadership to be an undermining from within and from without. They felt outside pressures which included Congressional scrutiny, lack of money and appropriations, poor public image and civilian criticism. Pressures from within included the need to modernize,

to maintain combat readiness and to "do more with less." There was a dichotomy in the perception of leadership. The result was that image and effectiveness of the leadership were reduced and rated retention continued to decline.

A second aspect, the future of the Air Force leadership, was affected by a reduction in the number of officers and by the loss of opportunity for the officer. Fewer officers meant less experience and less potential from which to chose future leaders. More important than the loss of numbers was the loss of opportunity to develop future leaders. The losses caused by the rated retention problem forced a curtailment or reduction in the opportunity for collateral maturity of future leaders. Availability of professional military education, staff positions and experience, Air Force Institute of Technology and other educational programs were reduced to the rated officer.

COMBAT READINESS

A snapshot of the combat readiness of the Air Force at the close of 1979 showed a force below expectations and planned levels of combat effectiveness. Reductions in combat readiness were not totally attributed to the retention problem, but had been worsened by the problem.

Unexpected losses, reduction in experience along with manning considerations had lowered combat readiness. Losses above planned rates had induced a shortage of 1302 rated officers by December 1979. Those losses had reduced highly qualified, mid-level supervisors and instructors that were necessary to groom and maintain an

effective combat force. Rated experience was low. Total flying hours per individual were down from previous averages. Overall manning figures remained relatively high, however spot conditions existed where manning significantly reduced combat effectiveness. There were other considerations which combined with unexpected losses, reduced experience and manning considerations to lower combat readiness. These considerations were identified by the TAC aircrew concerns report. Training systems were overtaxed to the point of producing quantity, not quality. Personnel stability was dramatically decreased to meet necessary turnovers. Funds reductions by Congress had significantly reduced flying time available for training. A large percentage of the rated expertise was deployed overseas. The force was strained by expending large sums of money to maintain combat readiness away from the homeland.

Combat effectiveness of the Air Force at the end of 1979 was not at the level planned. It appeared the Air Force was not fully prepared for an immediate, all-out war. The force was not incapable of combat, but was considerably weakened by the rated retention problem. If the retention problem continued, combat readiness would drop to a national security crisis level.

THE OTHER SIDE

There was another view of the rated retention problem that opposed the generally accepted one. That view embraced one or more of the following arguments to discredit the original claim that retention was a problem. That view stated that rated officer retention was not a problem. At worst, it was a depression in the acquisition and retention curve of the Air Force personnel system and

would return to normal. At best, it was a blessing in disguise. The other view of the problem was not without some merit and is examined here.

One widely accepted, and probably the most valid, supportive argument for the other view was that aircrew losses forced staff review, reevaluation and reductions. Staff directorates were required to specify why rated expertise was necessary for each staff position; what benefits were derived from filling that position with a rated officer; what effects would occur if the position were either not filled or filled with nonrated/civilian/enlisted. After staff evaluations, Headquarters Air Force directed a "prioritization" of rated crew manning. Staffs at all levels were reduced and rated officers were returned to the cockpits. This review and reduction succeeded in filling necessary aviation requirements but there were tradeoffs.[10] Staff capability was obviously lowered and the opportunity for rated officers to receive staff experience was reduced.

A second argument was that losses forced the Air Force to return to active flying duty segments of its force hidden in reserve ... its rated supplement. The losses pushed two-thirds of the supplement back into the rated force by 1979. Such a rapid reduction in the rated supplement caused considerable concern.

Two additional arguments reinforced each other. One, the retention problem caused a reduction in force which more finely tuned the force; two, the loss meant less output in the form of military pay and retirement thus reduced the expenditures per tasking. The counter, the reduction in force was not equally distributed

nor surgically pure. It created a void in the most productive, and most essential, group of rated officers, the 6 to 11 year group. It did not fine tune the force, but lowered the experience and the productivity below levels deemed necessary for solid defense. The loss in caliber of individuals and in experience was substantial; could not be compensated for by the reduced numbers of dedicated individuals who remained. An actual "savings" in military pay did not exist. The damage done through loss of morale, loss of combat capability would have to be replaced. The cost to replace that loss would far exceed any reductions in pay and retirement.

A final argument was that rated talent was not actually lost to the Air Force or to the military machine. It was moved from the active force to the reserves. The counter, loss of rated talent came at a time when the active force needed the experience to build and modernize. Less than 30% of that talent was captured by the active reserve; most went into the Individual Readiness Reserve (IRR). To return talent from the IRR would mean many additional training dollars and training manhours not available. Even if money and manhours were available, it would not be possible to regain the full talent of the individuals lost. Much would be lost to atrophy, most would be drained through loss of motivation. Individual who elected to get out and were then recalled, would not be as dedicated or as motivated as they originally were.

SUMMARY

The rated retention problem began as early as 1970 and manifested itself through unrest and dissatisfaction and finally, by

1977, through massive losses of rated officers. By 1979, pilot retention was below 30 percent and less than half that needed to sustain the force. Most of the problem was attributed to increased losses in the 6 to 11 year group. There were ramifications of the rated retention problem which were intricately interwoven and as significant as the loss of experience. The cost associated with the losses of rated officers was over one billion dollars. Replacement of the manpower and rated talent would be difficult and expensive. Morale was lowered, leadership was less effective than normal and combat readiness was reduced. An element within the Air Force suggested modest advantages derived from the retention problem. But that element was a minority and the advantages suggested were questionable.

CHAPTER III

REASONS FOR THE PROBLEM

OVERVIEW

As indicated in Chapter 2, aircrew retention was a large and expanding problem for the Air Force at the close of 1979. It was a complex problem, not fully understood and most assuredly not controlled. The reasons for the problem were numerous and intricately interwoven. The author here identifies the reasons for the rated retention problem The vehicle used for identification is the Tactical Air Command report entitled "Conference on TAC Aircrew Concerns." Specific problems and recommendations recorded in the report identify basic reasons for the rated retention problem. They are rewritten for clarity and understanding in this section. Two items are presented prior to the problems and recommendations. They are a background of the conference and an analysis of the written report.

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFERENCE

For understanding, it is significant and enlightening to examine the background and the immediate events which lead to the TAC conference. Two pieces of information had bearing upon the conference. One, General Wilbur L. Creech, commander of Tactical Air Command and the man who actually called the conference, took office only months prior to the conference. [1] General Creech was absorbed in the procedures of assuming command; in making himself totally knowledgable of that command, its assets and its problems; in establishing his procedures and policies. Two, the rated retention problem within the Tactical

Air Command was greater in magnitude than expected. The retention problem surfaced later in TAC than other MAJCOMS and was expected to be smaller in scope.

The immediate events leading to the conference began in late summer 1978. TAC/DP provided information to the commander which said unprecedented numbers of TAC aircrews were getting out and a retention problem was apparently building. The commander's immediate reply questioned the problem and pointed to improvements that included increased flying time for all crew members and more realistic training.[2] By September, General Creech and the TAC staff had confirmed the retention problem and General Creech requested TAC/DP convene a conference of concerned aircrews. His guidance was to find out what the aircrews felt, find out their reasons for getting out and see what can be done. [3]

The last week in September and the first week in October 1978 were filled with necessary and hurried preparations. Major Don Rakestraw was appointed TAC/DP action officer for the conference. A list of attendees was compiled and individuals telephonically notified. On 4 October 1978, TAC/DP formally tasked thirty aircrew members to convene at Langley AFB, Virginia on 17 October to "look into the recent decrease in aircrew retention within TAC ... to look into the various areas and activities within our units which affect the way of life of aircrew members." [4]

CONFERENCE ATTENDEES

The thirty conference attendees were selected to fulfill two broad objectives: (1) to obtain a group representative of the TAC fighter force, (That group was to include, where possible, at least one crew member from each type aircraft.) (2) to select

individuals experienced enough to know the problem and candid enough to express it. [5] There were obviously other factors considered during the selection process. The need to limit the group to a workable size, the time constraint between notification to convene and actual convening were just two such factors. But the driving factor that determined why these individuals were selected was the need to convene a group representative of the TAC crew force that could, and would, "tell it like it is."

All individuals who attended the TAC conference were rated, "concerned" aircrews. [6] There were two majors and twenty-eight captains between the sixth and eleventh years of service, who either lived the daily routines of the squadron aircrew or who came in contact with the problems of aircrews every day. An analysis of the group reveals the following.[7] Only five of the group were not functioning as line aircrews at the time of the conference. Twenty-seven were pilots and three were weapons systems operators. Approximately 75% were experienced instructors, nine were formal course (RTU) instructors. They represented thirteen TAC aircraft from the E-3A to the F-15. They came from nineteen separate locations.

CONFERENCE LEADERSHIP

The leadership selection for the conference offered a unique challenge. To encourage free exchange among the attendees and to provide an atmosphere where "telling it like it is" would be accepted, the leaders could not dominate by virtue of rank or position or personality. Yet, they would have to retain sufficient control to accomplish the work required of the group. The leaders would have to be knowledgable of the current situations affecting the aircrews.

They would have to possess a special rapport with their junior colleagues; a respect for their positions, their sincerity and their frustrations. The leaders would also have to be acceptable to the organization. Their rank would have to be sufficient to control with authority; their position within the organization should lend creditability to their efforts; they would have to be acceptable to the commander. Selection of the leadership and the duties of the leadership were unique and sensitive areas.

The three leaders selected for the conference were full colonels, one wing commander and two vice commanders. Colonel Von Christiansen, Commander 363 TFW, Mt. Home, Idaho, was a soft spoken, easy going individual who knew how to effectively temper the approach. He functioned to constantly orient the group toward goals and time objectives. Colonel Stanton Musser, Vice-Commander 1 TFW, Langley AFB, Virginia, was an experienced fighter pilot who established immediate rapport with the group. He functioned as a mediator between the group and the leadership and as the "sounding board" who could effectively listen, empathize and aid analysis. Colonel James B. Davis, Vice-Commander 388 TFW, Hill AFB, Utah, was an articulate grammarian. He functioned as the "hard charger" who dug into situations and advised with authority and clarity. [8] All three were well suited to their mission by disposition. They functioned effectively as individuals, efficiently as a tri-command group and made positive contributions to the conference. They provided guidance and situational awareness without dominating or alienating.

CONFERENCE TASKING

The tasking for the conference was not specific at the onset of the actual conference. There were reasons why that occurred and there were positive, as well as negative, results from that situation.

General guidance provided by the TAC staff was broad and did not provide specific goals and objectives.[9] A written report was not a specific requirement until after the initial meeting with General Creech. Before that time, neither the commander, the staff nor the conferees knew what the end product of the conference was to be. A meeting between the general and the conference members was planned, but the specifics of that meeting had not been established. The procedures for group interactions were tentative. Three subgroups were established and expected areas of interest were defined, but coordination procedures were not specific.

The conferees had no clear understanding of expectations. Each individual understood he was to express his concern for the problem; that he was to tell it like he saw it from his perceptions and experiences; that he was to "carry the banner" from his base, group and home station. But there was not a collective understanding on how best to project individual ideas, collectively. To whom and how were they going to express themselves was not understood.

There were different expectations that surrounded the questions of Additional Duties and Ground Training. The TAC staff expected the aircrews to come armed to discuss and provide recommendations to improve Additional Duties and reduce Ground Training requirements. The conferees expected to discuss the entire spectrum of the retention

problem. They expected to point out aspects other than Additional Duties and Ground Training that had not been adequately identified.

There was a positive result attributed to the pre-conference uncertainty. The situation enabled the aircrews to express views on goals and objectives to be attained by the conference. The uncertainty allowed the leadership to be receptive to those inputs. The situation lent itself to management by objectives. The leaders and subordinates defined and determined the objectives and worked together to achieve them.

The leadership must be given credit for facilitating the positive enough to see the situation, receptive enough to listen to the conferees, strong enough to make changes to facilitate positive group interactions. Credit must be shared jointly between the three appointed leaders and the TAC leadership.

GROUP DYNAMICS

Postive group dynamics were a fundamental reason for the success of the conference. They are examined here through an observation of the "mindset" of the conference, and a recount of the dynamics of the initial meeting.

The mindset of the conference was determined by two key factors. One, there was a necessity for the TAC organization to understand the retention problem. Two, there was a strong determination of the aircrews to make their reasons known and to effectively use this forum to project the causes for the problem.

The necessity of the organization and the determination of the conferees provided a results-oriented atmosphere.

The initial meeting of the conference was a classic group dynamics confrontation. It was effectively managed and opened the door for the success of the conference. The meeting began in a small room that forced people together and fostered group interactions. Prior to the opening, there was normal milling around, meeting of acquaintances, introductions to strangers and exchanges of greetings. The chairs were movable and were rearranged by the group to reinforce cliques with different positions and ideas. The formal portion began with an introduction of the TAC staff, an introduction of the three appointed leaders, a cursory rundown of the problem as the staff saw it. Control of the conference was then turned over to Colonel Christiansen. He elaborated on the guidance provided by the organization and suggested the conference begin.

At that point a significant exchange occurred. There was a rustling of papers, a shifting of body positions, a murmur of discontentment and a strange unspoken unity of efforts built within the conferees. A question to the leaders broke the silence and that was followed by a controlled flood of emotions, ventings of frustrations, questioning of the approach and suggestions of improvements. Two things were vitally important here. The leadership listened, partially because they were uncertain of the approach and partially because they were good leaders; the conferees did not become overbearing or obnoxious.[10] The net resutls were:

(1) a much-needed opportunity to get the emotions, frustrations and feelings of the conferees out into the open; (2) an open and frank exchange between the organizations and the conference that determined how much the organization knew and established how vital the problem was to the conferees; (3) a questioning of the procedures, agenda and objectives that resulted in a reevaluation, definition, and collective agreement.

A positive effect was achieved through group dynamics. That effect began with the initial confrontation and was sustained by a results-oriented mindset. Three major accomplishments were achieved through group dynamics. Viable dynamics enhanced already strong commitments to work the retention problem and added immeasurably to conference success.

ANALYSIS OF THE WRITTEN REPORT

The product of the TAC Aircrew Concerns Conference, 17 - 20 October 1978, is a 31-page report entitled, "Conference of TAC Aircrew Concerns," published by Headquarters Tactical Air Command. (Reproduction in Appendix A) That report makes a significant professional contribution, but its appearance, presentation and projection of content do not adequately support that fact. In reality it is a document that contains vital information projected by poor grammar and awkward style.

The report makes the following contributions. It identifies reasons for the retention problem; provides insight into the problem; provides a grass-roots, affected group view of the problem. It confirms

problems and recommendations identified from other sources; provides additional proof or confirmation of those findings. It expresses the feelings of the affected group; most importantly, it reaffirms and reassures the Air Force that the affected group is still very much committed.

This analysis of the report relates the circumstances surrounding the writing; elaborates on the character or image of the report; explains the format and physical layout of the report.

CIRCUMSTANCES

There were circumstances surrounding the writing of the report that helped define its character. One was that initial efforts of the conference were not directed toward a written report. The conference labored under the belief that recommendations were to be presented orally to the commander. Attention focused on exposing the issues and preparing for oral presentation; discussing issues to disclose aspects or to reach concensus.

Another circumstance which defined the character of the report was an all-out effort by the conference not to inhibit candid expressions of concern. Individuals were encouraged to present their views, even without academic trapping and adequate support, openly and candidly. Polished grammar and significant support were not required. Common experiences and peer pressures were the standards that allowed candid expression without support. The report adopted the same procedure, open candidness without polish and support. However, without academic support, the report does not project the data clearly. It is difficult to read the report and extract full understanding.

Other circumstances included the following. Guidance for the content, composition and scope of the written report was meager. Administration assistance provided minimum support and was procured late. Editorial and publication responsibilities were established after much of the report was written. [11] Group procedures for writing the report adversely impacted the final product.

A summary of group writing procedures illustrates how that circumstance affected the character of the report and records the procedures for historical purposes. Group writing procedures were established after the tasking for a report was finalized. Data presented orally to General Creech was the basis for the report. A format was established by the conference and three subgroups were tasked to recall and write a part of the data. The subgroups prepared initial drafts and read them before the combined conference; the conference recommended approval or change. When approval was obtained, the subgroup had that data typed, edited the typed draft and presented it again to the conference. After final conference approval, the report was reviewed for typographical and grammatical errors.

These aspects of the group writing procedures had an adverse impact on the final character of the report. The procedures relied on recall and written presentation of oral data. Recall is never perfect. Time constraints and insufficient writing skills made it impossible to capture the full essence and emotion of the oral presentations. Dividing the report among three subgroups increased diversity of writing styles. Group approval and group editing further increased diversity and fostered unorthodox writing styles.

CHARACTER

The character of a written document is defined by that aggregate of features and traits which form the individual nature. Features of a written work include grammar, style and data. The character of the TAC aircrew concerns report contains both limiting and enlightening features.

A limiting feature of the report is grammar. Jargon and "fighter pilot" terminology are used throughout the document. Prose in the report is basic, and syntax is sometimes misaligned. These traits make the report appear parochial.

Style is the biggest limiting feature of the report. A uniform manner of writing is not maintained throughout the document.

There are limitations other than grammar and style. They include some inconsistencies in arguments; some limited support for facts. These two limitations exist because of depth in career experience among the individuals who wrote the report. Because of common experiences and backgrounds, there was no need for those individuals to organize arguments with grand support. But for the report these limitations cause the substance of the report to be suspect. They appear to lower the credibiilty and acceptability of the data.

There is one feature that forms the character of the report which is positive and irrefutable. Data provided is valid, is produced from experience and identifies those reasons which cause the rated retention problem. Situations and conditions reported by the conferees exist. Perceptions, based on personal experiences, form the basis of that data. The subjects who reported the data daily live with the retention problem; are intimately familiar with the reasons

for the problem.

The character of the report is unique. The limitations identified, make understanding more difficult, but do not impair the data. That fact must be recognized as one attempts an anlysis of the rated retention problem through the TAC report. Notwithstanding those character limitations, the report provides unparalleled insight into the reasons for the rated retention problem.

REPORT FORMAT

The layout and format of the TAC aircrew concerns report detract from comprehension. The arrangement of data is confusing and the organization of the material within the sections is inconsistent. To clarify the format enhances understanding of the report and of the rated retention problem. Clarity is improved by providing general comments about the organization of the report and reorganizing the material in each section and subsection. A synopsis of each is provided with comments that explain circumstances and criteria. The material is presented in Tables 4 through 12.

The report is organized into four major sections and seven subsections. The four major sections are: Introduction, Additional Duties, Ground Training and Irritants. The Introduction is a special case and is explained in detail later. The Additional Duties and Ground Training sections are addendums to that information collected and available at TAC at the time of the conference. The section , Irritants, constitutes seventy-five percent of the report and is divided into seven subsections. Those seven subsections are not equal in importance nor are they arranged in a hierarchy. They are a logical presentation of items surfaced by the conference.

SYNOPSES

Introduction: The Introduction is the device through which General Creech, Commander of TAC, expresses the purpose for convening the conference, his perception of the accomplishments of the conference and his directions for the use of the report. [12]

At the time of the conference, General Creech expressed genuine concern for the report. [13] He did not want the fact that the report was published nor the content of the report to be misconstrued. He expresses those concerns through the introduction.

Additional Duties: A real and significant problem existed with the numbers and types of Additional Duties assigned aircrews. That fact is identified and developed in this section. Information here must be combined with additional information available at TAC Headquarters to fully develope this problem area.

Ground Training: Ground Training requirements, by numbers and types, were not in concert with the needs of the aircrews nor the Air Force. Areas of the Ground Training problem, where conferee's firsthand knowledge or strong reservations or viable suggestions existed, are presented in this section. The Ground Training data presented is not a complete statement of the problem, only an addendum.

Irritants: Irritants is a misnomer. Issues of aircrew concern that range from management practices, perceptions of quality of life, to combat capabilities are presented here. Those issues are structured into seven subsections and are presented immediately after this paragraph. Issues sometimes overlap. They are subjectively ordered.

Personnel Management/Assignment Issues: Aircrew dissatisfactions with management practices that govern the force are identified in this subsection. Several significant, but controversial, issues and options are surfaced which warrant additional study and considerations.

Leadership: Erosion of the authority and responsibilities of Air Force leaders and lack of confidence in organizational leadership are expressed in this subsection. Disapproval of the perceived trend toward managers and not leaders is also expressed.

Reporting Systems: Dissatisfaction with reports and indicators collected by the organization is surfaced here. Problems include the numbers and types of reports, effectiveness of reports, misuse of reports by the organization and the integrity loss associated with the reports.

Aircraft Maintenance Capability: Maintenance practices and problems which dissatisfy aircrews and reduce combat capability are found here. Adequate organizational support that will allow maintenance to perform effectively is recommended.

Oversupervision: Management practices are identified which belittle aircrews' responsibilities and stymie motivation.

Quality of Training: RTU instructor capabilities and simulator usage are addressed. Other areas that effect training are incorporated into Quality of Life, Reporting Systems and Personnel Management.

Quality of Life: Issues that produce extremely long duty days, that make working conditions unacceptable, that affect the individual and his motivation are identified. This subsection appears to be a potpourri of conditions and recommendations, but it is one of the most

significant parts of the report. Pay and benefits are addressed here.

MATERIAL REVIEW

The analysis of the report to now has indicated that organization of material is a limitation to clarity and understanding. Data from the report is presented here in tabular form and is reworded. Each table is arranged to show problems and associated recommendations in shortened, outline-type statements. The index below shows the Table and the section and subsection association.

TABLE 4.	Additional Duties
TABLE 5.	Ground Training
TABLE 6.	Personnel Management/Assignment Issues
TABLE 7.	Leadership and Management
TABLE 8.	Reporting Systems
TABLE 9.	Aircraft Maintenance Capability
TABLE 10.	Oversupervision
TABLE 11.	Quality of Training
TABLE 12.	Quality of Life
TABLE 13.	Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs

TABLE 4. ADDITIONAL DUTIES

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Number of additional duties is excessive; many are not related to aircrew needs.	
2. Additional duty workloads impair aircrews' performance of primary flying duties.	TAC Commander should continue support of efforts conducted by TAC/DOOT.
3. Unit commanders cannot, or do not, take actions to reduce additional duties. This raises a question of commander authority and/or integrity; both are factors of the retention problem.	*-reduce the number of Additional Duties. -remove Additional Duties that are not related to primary duty.

*NOTE: Items preceded by a dash are related to comments directly above the item and/or directly to the left of the item.

TABLE 5. GROUND TRAINING

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Ground training requirements -do not reflect aircrew needs. -are excessive in number and overtask aircrews. -are not controlled to avoid proliferation.	Identify, correlate and manage all Ground Training requirements: -establish an office of primary responsibility to manage total ground training. -require TAC units to determine what ground training is necessary and forward to TAC. -convene a working group at TAC to determine total requirements. Incorporate the following 16 suggestions into the ground training requirements...(SEE APPENDIX A, SECTION B, PAGES 98 and 99.

TABLE 6. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT/ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Present personnel system is not responsive to aircrew needs; aircrews have limited control over their careers; there is insufficient/ inadequate individual participation in career progression.	
2. Commitments assigned for aircraft upgrade programs appear inconsistent.	
3. Individuals assigned to less desirable assignments are not compensated.	-Give special consideration (dues paying assignment) to some designated assignments.
4. Short notice, "fall out assignments" occur and are unacceptable; should not happen.	-Personnel managers should improve planning to eliminate this problem.
5. Remote/long tour return dates as criteria for aircraft conversion is inadequate.	
6. Current use of Form 90 does not appear to produce positive results.	-Managers should present choices to aircrews when Form 90 assignments are not available and allow aircrews to choose from possibilities.
**7. (Excessive staff and non-flying job requirements).	-Zero base current staff and non-flying job requirements.
8. (Lack of career progression in main-stream flying duties).	-Reward mainstream flying duties by adequate recognition and promotion.
9. Time-on-station practices are inconsistent and cause hardships.	-Make time-on-station constraints consistent; reduce hardships caused by aircrew turnover.

**NOTE: Items in parenthesis are supplied by the author for clarity.

TABLE 6. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT/ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM (CONTINUED)

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
10. Tactical Air Control System (TACS) critically needs command attention: -combat capability is questionable, -demands of the system cannot be satisfied, -crews are frustrated and demotivated.	-Restructure, revitalize or abolish the TACS system; dual qualified aircrews can accomplish TACS mission.
11. Procedures for incorporating FAIPS into the TAF causes widespread aircrew dissatisfaction.	
12. Procedures for rotating staff personnel back to operations do not insure the individuals are knowledgeable or adequately trained.	-Improve refresher training; assure individuals are combat ready prior to assuming command.
13. Closed-loop systems restrict people in some TAF aircraft.	-Establish career development policies to "cross-fertilize" the closed systems.
14. TAC C-130 assets are not managed by TAC personnel.	-(TAC personnel should control C-130 assets); allow cross-training for C-130 aircrews to fill some fighter/FAC assignments.
15. The career for a WSO in TAF is uncertain.	-Increase selection rate for UPT among TAF WSOs.(Provide broader career potential.)
16. (Revised OER format...)	-Ensure OERs properly reflect and credit flying duties.
17. (Up-or-Out Promotion System...)	-Eliminate up-or-out as the only career progression system; develop a separate system for a flying "technician" force.
18. (Job related non-flying assignments...)	-Select aircrews whose background compliment essential, non-mainstream and staff assignments. Air-to-Ground background for air-to-ground type staff job.

TABLE 7. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Certain requirements lower self-esteem and diminish the status of professional aircrews.	-Eliminate those requirements.
2. Decisionmaking and management are too centralized to adequately (appropriately) handle unit and individual career needs.	-Return decisionmaking and management to appropriate levels.
3. Aircrew perception is that "this is a one mistake Air Force."	
4. The system is not responsive to necessary and needed change.	-Eliminate NAF from TAC. (Eliminate sluggish responses to needs.)
5. Wing leadership is inadequate for the following reasons: -Air Force emphasizes efficient managers, not effective leaders, -leaders are out of touch with tactics and combat capability, -leaders and wings are overtasked, -leaders do not delegate authority commensurate with responsibility.	-(Properly train men to be leaders, not managers. Support and trust leaders.... delegate sufficient authority to handle responsibilities.) -Leaders should support their commanders and exercise confidence in them.
6. Attainment of squadron leadership positions does not motivate nor provide job satisfaction because of the following reasons: -insufficient authority and decision making opportunity, -inability to insulate unit from or control outside taskings, -oversupervision.	

TABLE 8. REPORTING SYSTEM

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Reports of aircraft tail number deviations and additions/ deletions do not reflect true maintenance practices nor operational upheavals.	
2. Utilization rates and sortie production rates do not reflect operational training nor combat capability.	-Reevaluate reporting indicators. Ensure they reflect realistic capability and effective management.
3. Aircrew manning reports do not reflect true unit manning or capability.	
4. Established channels of communication and reporting are inefficient and effective	-Ensure communications and channels, both up and down, are open and receptive.

TABLE 9. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Maintenance problems and practices reduce aircrew combat capability and contribute to aircrew dissatisfaction.	-Raise annual flying training hours for TAC aircrews. Provide more effective (quality and quantity) flying time. -Provide the resources for maintenance to support the additional training. -Move back to squadron maintenance; could improve morale, would enhance aircrew/maintenance communication and operations, probably be as, or more, efficient.
2. Aircraft are often flown to meet maintenance reporting criteria rather than operational/training requirement.	-Stop the practice of maintenance dictating operational practices.
3. Late maintenance aircraft delivery practices waste valuable aircrew manhours,contribute to long aircrew and maintenance duty days, and foster aircrew and maintenance discontent.	-Allow operational supervisors and aircrews more latitude to determine utilization of degraded weapons systems and acceptance of late maintenance delivery.

TABLE 10. OVERSUPERVISION

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Number and types of tests required for aircrew evaluations are excessive.	-Abolish "supervised" bold face written examinations. Reduce the frequency and types of general testing.
2. Supervision of Flying (SOF) supervision of cross-country flights on weekends is unnecessary, yet required by regualtion.	-Eliminate weekend/non-duty SOF requirements.
3. Procedures for utilizing rated personnel in manning Runway Supervisor Units (RSU) do not properly use aircrew manhours; do frustrate aircrews.	-Man RSUs with qualified NCOs. Abolish night RSU duty.
4. Regulations are often restricted excessively by intermediate headquarters.	-Reduce excessive supplementation and restriction of regulations.

TABLE 11. QUALITY OF TRAINING

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Replacement Training Unit (RTU) instructors cannot maintain expertise in current tactics and threats.	-Modify Program Flying Time (PFT) to allow instructors continuation training to include Red Flag participation.
2. Simulator technology, procurement and utilization have not kept pace with aircrew needs or aircraft performance capabilities.	-Evaluate and remove missions that cannot be effectively flown from simulator training programs.
3. (Simulator utilization is driven by HHQ to satisfy utilization rates, not to accommodate aircrew training.)	-Do not require simulators to operate 16 hours per day when aircrew training requirements do not dictate such requirements.

TABLE 12. QUALITY OF LIFE

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Long duty days: Aircrews work 11 to 16 hours per day and have been consistently working those hours for many years. Long duty days are necessitated by poor Air Force management. Long duty days and inadequate compensation and recognition cause job dissatisfaction.	-Reduce additional duties and ground training to that which is necessary and manageable. -Stop overtasking; stop the effect of tacking on additional work to original taskings as it proceeds through each echelon of command. -Establish a maximum crew duty day at 10 hours; maximum work week at 50 hours during normal peacetime operations. -Establish (and adhere to) mandatory compensation by time off for alert duty or other duty which extends the crew's duty week. -Return to squadron maintenance to reduce flying duty day...
2. Many extended TDYs and higher headquarters exercises are not well managed and personnel requirements are often excessive.	-Aircrew tasking for exercises should be made well in advance; not at the "last minute". -Ensure aircrews are properly used during TDYs/exercises; requirements demand rated expertise; pilots and WSOs are interchanged where possible.

TABLE 12. QUALITY OF LIFE (CONTINUED)

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
3. Rewards, both tangible and intangible, do not meet the needs or the expectations of the aircrews. Pay and benefits are insufficient and decreasing... -Pay is not commensurate with individual needs nor organizational demands. -Pay caps have prevented salaries from maintaining equity with inflation. -Presidents Pay Commission fosters frustration and uncertainty over retirement benefits. -Medical treatment for dependents is either lacking, inadequate, or hard to acquire. -G.I. Bill ends in 1989.	-Tell and convince the President and Congress that Air Force personnel are suffering financially; are frustrated by uncertainty and "lack" of benefits. NOTE: Additional information and discussion of Pay and Benefits follow this table. -Increase amount and quality of medical staff and equipment. Meet dependent needs immediately through commercial plans.
4. Aircrews perceive their only reward for a job well done is no punishment.	-Stop management practices that lend to perception of one mistake AF. -Rate, recognize and reward aircrew members adequately and properly; days off for jobs well done; assignment priority; etc.
5. Fighter aircrew prestige and exprit de corps have been effectively reduced by organizational constraints (and inadequate national support.) Organizational constraints include: -Reduction in responsibility, self-pride and recognition of flight status.	-Return prestige and authority to fighter squadron command; reinstate sqdn fly-bys; allow sqdn CC to approve x-countries. -Improve the treatment of aircrews: --reinstate the responsibility, pride & recognition of special flight status, i.e., flight lead, IP/IWSO, etc. --pay per diem for X-country flights. --provide necessary transportation adequate for TDY duties. --reduce the long duty day. --reestablish beer in squadrons. -Improve sqdn facilities & working conditions.

NOTE TO ACCOMPANY TABLE 12: MONEY - PAY AND BENEFITS

Money and its relationship to the rated retention problem have been poorly defined. Military personnel avoid confrontations about money as long as perceived basic needs are met. There is hesitation for military personnel to seek pay adjustments. But a pay threshold does exist (below which perceived basic needs are not met) and once that threshold is reached, military personnel actively seek fiscal redress. Part of the rated retention problem exists because aircrews are seeking fiscal redress. To improve the understanding of that relationship between military personnel and money is the purpose of this section.

Money is not the number one item of dissatisfaction in the TAC aircrew concerns report. Why?

Money is not the key incentive or motivator behind Air Force rated officers. The "calling," the profession, the organization the type of job and job satisfaction are stronger motivators, under normal circumstances, than money. Money is a maintenance factor. As long as it provides "adequate" support, it will not become a major factor. When it falls below that undefined and relative threshold of adequacy, it will become the most important factor in the retention equation.

Why is money mentioned at all in the report?

a. Military people are beginning to hurt, financially. Three pay caps in 1975, 1978 and 1979 cost the military 7.2% in purchasing power. Inflation has reduced that purchasing power still further, so that the net result is a 14% decline in purchasing power since 1973. Lower military ranks cannot provide adequately on their Air Force pay. [14] Rated officers can no longer effect comparable life styles with their civilian contemporaries; must significantly lower their family standards to live in high cost areas such as Washington, D.C.

b. Military people are aggmenting the Air Force organization with personal incomes. They incur necessary expenses during PCS, over and above those compensated by the Air Force, and pay for them out of their own pocket. Each year military people who are transferred spend 1 BILLION dollars out of personal incomes. That equates to over $3,000 for a family of four. [15] The result of this fiscal augmentation to the organization is a net reduction in military pay below that lost to inflation and pay caps.

c. There is no improvement to the fiscal problem on the horizon. To the contrary, it appears that military pay and benefits may be cut further. Talk of changes to the retirement system, of reductions in pay and benefits foster discontentment and doubt,

and are consistent with 1979 trends to make the military a fiscal example for the nation.

e. Reality for the American fighting man is the fact that he is not getting equal or just treatment relative to the American public; nor relative to the service he performs. The civilian society has improved its lot during the last 10 years while it has allowed the military's to rapidly decline. Services provided by the military require great personal and family sacrifice, but the ultimate sacrifice extracted is the necessity to die for the country. Adequate pay and benefits, nor national recognition, are not extended to the military man to compensate for those sacrifices. Historically the American fighting man was compensated for poor pay through purveyance -- goods and services -- and an occasional pat on the back by the nation. Today purveyance is tantamount to nonexistence; recognition of the necessity for military strength has been replaced with apathy; pay and benefits do not compensate for the two losses nor do they provide adequate funding for requirements.

TABLE 12. QUALITY OF LIFE (CONTINUED)

PROBLEMS	RECOMMENDATIONS
5. Prestige...continued: -Elimination of expressions of esprit within TAC Officer's Clubs - removal of bells in the bars; forbidding gaming of "Dead Bug"; elimination of or restrictions to wearing the flight suits in certain clubs.	-Eliminate unnecessary restrictions to Officer's Clubs; reestablish bar rules; bells, flight suits.
6. Support facilities do not adequately provide for aircrew needs nor do they give priority to support the flying mission requirements. (Support facilities include both in-service agents (CBPO/ Finance, etc) and out-service agents (BX/Credit Union, etc.)	-Support facilities should recognize and respond to aircrew needs. -Leaders should establish priorities for support agencies which would recognize the importance of the flying mission requirements. -Establish priority treatment for critical asset of aircrew manhours.

SUMMARY

The author presents three objectives in Chapter III. He provides background information concerning the TAC aircrew concerns conference; provides an analysis of the report, "Conference on TAC Aircrew Concerns" which points out limitations and advantages; identifies the reasons for the Air Force rated retention problem.

The TAC aircrew concerns conference, the first in a series convened by TAC, was held 17 - 20 October 1978. There were thirty "concerned" rated officers who represented the TAC flying community and were chosen to candidly "tell it like it is." The leadership of the conference was unique and functioned effectively. There were minor organizational problems encountered by the conference which were overcome by leadership, enthusiastic individual participation and group dynamics.

The report produced by the conference is a thirty-one page document that is somewhat limited by poor grammar, awkward style and organization. But the limitations do not invalidate the substance of the report.

The reasons for the Air Force rated retention problem are identified by the "Conference on TAC Aircrew Concerns" report. Tables 4 through 12 outline specific problems, and recommendations, in nine areas of concern. Information presented in those tables is raw data which documents individual and specific reasons for the rated retention problem. This data must be refined, organized and analyzed.

One method for refining the raw data is to organize or arrange it so that it reveals major causes for the retention problem. The major underlying factor projected by all the data is a lack of job satisfaction. That lack of satisfaction contains two elements, individual concerns and organizational concerns. Those two elements contain four areas under which all the problems identified through the raw data may be organized. Those areas are Quality of Life, Personnel Management, Leadership and Management and Combat Capability. A schematic organization for the arrangement of the raw data is presented below. It proceeds from major cause to major areas of concern.



CHAPTER IV

THE APPRAISAL

OVERVIEW

A presentation of the reasons for the rated retention problem does not adequately appraise the situation. To understand the problem, one must organize the reasons and analyze them through some logical process. The appraisal presented in this chapter does both, organize and analyze. The organization is accomplished through an Organizational Chart which depicts the reasons and causes in a graphic display. The Chart is evaluated using graphic procedures. The analysis is accomplished by an association of the reasons with three psychological models. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Maier's Needs and Incentives and Herzberg's Motivation-Hygiene Concept are used for evaluation of the reasons.

AN ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

The reasons for the aircrew retention problem presented by the TAC aircrew concerns report are provided in original form in Appendix A; have been rewritten for clarity in Chapter 3; are presented in this section in an Organizational Chart. That chart is provided in Figure 4. The purpose of the chart is to graphically display the relationship between the reasons and major causes associated with the rated retention problem; and to provide a vehicle for further analysis of the problem through Maslow and Maier.

The idea of the Organizational Chart was conceived by five



FIGURE 4. AN ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE CAUSES AND REASONS FOR THE RATED RETENTION PROBLEM

members of the original TAC Aircrew Concerns Conference. Through extensive content analysis of the TAC report, they were able to determine that all of the reasons presented before the conference could be organized into four major groups; Combat Capability, Leadership and Management, Personnel Management and Quality of Life. Through additional content analysis, which considered the relationships between the four groupings, three major causes for the rated retention problem were determined. Those causes were a dissatisfaction with Organizational Readiness, a lack of Job Satisfaction, and a dissatisfaction with Individual Securities. The Organizational Chart depicts the result of the content analysis of the report.

The chart is arranged with two basic areas. The center area (3 rectangular blocks) contains the three major causes for the rated retention problem. The outer area contains the specific reasons for the rated retention problem. The reasons are those identified by the TAC conference, but they have been shortened to significant words and arranged in outline format. The reasons are organized into the four major groupings.

It is significant and enlightening to look at the relationships suggested by the graphic display. Those relationships provide a unique view of the rated retention problem. The relationships are conveyed through two analogies, a funnel analogy and an atomic analogy; and through two graphic analyses of the chart.

The first relationship is described through the funnel analogy. If the page containing the chart were a funnel, the specific reasons identified around the side would form the cone of the funnel. The

three major causes in the center would form the spout of the funnel. If an individual were introduced to the rated retention problem by contact with one or more of the reasons identified, he would then funnel down the side of the cone or around the cone until he reached the spout. From the spout the individual would be ejected.

A second relationship is described through an atomic analogy. The retention problem can be visualized as an atom of a larger organism. That atom is composed of a nucleus (the 3 major causes) and sub-atomic particles (the reasons) rotating around the nucleus. The nucleus controls the reasons, and the reasons define the shape of the atom. It is an interactive system.

A third relationship is termed Tri-Level. The three major causes identified through content analysis are equivalent to three levels of concern: the individual (Individual Security), the job (Job Satisfaction) and the organization (Organizational Readiness). The chart is drawn in three columns. Each column is associated with a level of concern. From left to right, column one contains those reasons which impact most on the capability of the organization; column two contains those reasons which concern the job; column three contains those reasons of a personal, individual concern. Graphically the rated retention problem can be defined by three levels of concern. (See Figure 5)

A fourth relationship shown by the chart is called Dual-Level. This relationship is shown by separating the chart from upper right to lower left. This separation forms two halves which are labelled organizational and individual. The organizational half



FIGURE 5. TRI-LEVEL RELATIONSHIP OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



FIGURE 6. THE DUAL-LEVEL RELATIONSHIP OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

includes Organizational Readiness, Combat Capability, Leadership and Management and one-half of the Job Satisfaction. The individual half includes Individual Security, Quality of Life, Personnel Management and one-half of Job Satisfaction. The implication being that concerns for the organization form one-half of the retention problem and contribute to one-half of the job dissatisfaction. Concern for the individual form the second half of the problem and contribute to one-half of the job dissatisfaction. (See Figure 6)

The Organizational Chart is a device which provides the following services. It graphically portrays the rated retention problem on a single page. It arranges and presents the results of the content analysis performed on the TAC aircrew concerns report. It provides several views of the relationships between the specific reasons for the rated retention problem, and the major causes. And finally, it suggests through graphic analysis, that the problem is complex and multifaceted.

MASLOW

What causes an individual to exhibit behavior and why behavior is exhibited in a certain pattern are basic questions of the science of psychology. The area of psychology that deals with those basic questions is the study of motivation. Human motivation is a very intricate, complex process and one which is situationally dependent.

Abraham Maslow [1] advanced a theory of motivation which exemplifies the complexity of the human process. He defined five basic factors, called needs, which he believed determined behavior. He ordered the needs in a hierarchy from physiological, life sustaining

to psychological, self-fulfilling. His theory explained the intricate processes that occurred between needs and human behavior, and between the needs at one level in his hierarchy with the needs at another level. Maslow's hierarchy of needs is presented in Table 13.

TABLE 13. MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF HUMAN NEEDS

5. NEED FOR SELF-ACTUALIZATION: (desire for worthwhile accomplishments, self-fulfillment, personal growth)
4. ESTEEM NEEDS: (prestige, success, self-respect)
3. BELONGING AND LOVE NEEDS: (identification, affection)
2. SAFETY NEEDS: (security, health)
1. PHYSIOLOGICAL NEEDS: (hunger, thirst)

Maslow's hierarchy of needs lends itself to an analysis of the major causes of the rated retention problem. There are two points, that must be established prior to that analysis. First, the physiological needs of rated officers are not a determinant in the problem. The basic biological needs of hunger, thirst, etc., are met. Two, self-actualization is an apex that can be hard to attain until lower needs are satisfied. It is an all encompassing factor, an ideal for which to strive, and its effect on the problem is a constant. Self-actualization is a need so far above the retention problem that it acts as a constant goal, but is actually not a determinant in the problem.

The three remaining needs identified by Maslow--safety, belonging, esteem--are the essence of the rated retention problem and

can be associated directly with the major causes identified by the organizational chart. Figure 7 shows the relationships between the major causes of the problem identified by the TAC conference and Maslow's needs. The following paragraphs explain those relationships.

MASLOW'S NEEDS	AIR FORCE NEEDS
SELF-ACTUALIZATION	(IDEAL)
ESTEEM/PRESTIGE	ORGANIZATIONAL READINESS
IDENTIFICATION/BELONGING	JOB SATISFACTION
SECURITY/SAFETY	INDIVIDUAL SECURITY
PHYSIOLOGICAL NEEDS	(SUBSISTENCE)

FIGURE 7. COMPARISON BETWEEN MASLOW'S NEEDS AND THE MAJOR CAUSES OF THE RATED RETENTION PROBLEM

Individual security is on the same level as Maslow's Safety need and was not met by the Air Force in 1979. Data from the report indicated a very high level of concern from the rated officers for Individual Security or Safety. Questionable financial securities, career uncertainties and personal turbulences made them feel less than secure. Certain of the reasons identified actually infringed on the health and safety standards sought by the individuals.

Lack of job satisfaction was a theme which ran through the TAC report and caused a belonging crisis for the rated officer. An Air Force career is viewed as a "calling" and not simply an occupation. Rated officers identify themselves as "in the Air Force" not working for the Air Force. Yet their organization could not fulfill their job expectations. They found themselves with a need to belong and

a need to love that to which they belonged, but could not satisfy that need through an organization that produced intense job frustration.

Esteem and prestige, especially for the fighter aircrew, are realistically expressed through combat effectiveness. It is a part of the make-up of the military man to express his macho, his pride through effective combat; to fight and win! In times of peace that esteem and prestige are expressed through combat readiness. Data from the report indicated that rated officers perceived the combat capability of their organization was below desired standards. Leadership and management practices had reduced combat readiness, combat capability; had indirectly lowered individual esteem, prestige, and self-prestige.

What is evident, therefore, when one analyzes the reasons for the rated retention problem with the use of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, is this: of the five basic individual needs, the Air Force was able to satisfy only the subsistance need. That situation was untenable because rated officers had voluntarily relegated many of their needs to the organization and, therefore, had limited avenues outside of the organization from which to satisfy their needs. When the Air Force could not, or would not, satisfy those needs, the officers had no choice but to seek satisfaction from other sources; to leave the Air Force.

MAIER

Norman R. F. Maier [2] expressed the fact that human motivation can be situationally dependent as he defined the relationship between needs and incentives. Maier acknowledged motivation as a critical

determinant of behavior. But he suggested that motivating situations were determined by two aspects: one was subjective and one was objective. The subjective aspect was internal to the individual and called a need, a drive, a motive or a desire. A need was subjectively and internally defined. The objective aspect was external to the individual and called an incentive or a goal. The incentive was defined and/or made available by the environment. A situation was motivating, would determine behavior, when the "natures of the need and of the incentive were such that obtaining the incentive satisfied and therefore removed the need..." [3]

There are two obvious incentives or goals which could interact with the major needs created by the rated retention problem to produce a highly motivating situation; to stop the retention problem quickly. One incentive is money. [4] Money is a proven incentive and one which the rated force knows and accepts. The other incentive or goal is organizational change. The rated force knows organizational change is necessary, is knowledgeable enough to want positive change and is sophisticated enough not to accept negative change or change for change sake.

It is most enlightening to apply the two incentives to Maslow's needs and to the Air Force manifestations of those needs. (See Figure 8) From the figure, it is most obvious that money can improve the individual subsistence needs and can also improve the individual security needs. Money cannot, however, alleviate individual security needs associated with career uncertainty. Change cannot satisfy the subsistence needs, but interacts with money to improve individual

security needs. Change alone could affect job satisfaction and organizational readiness.

There are several observations that can be made from the application of the two incentives to the hierarchy or needs. Money alone cannot satisfy the needs of the Air Force nor can it alleviate the retention problem. Change alone cannot satisfy the needs of the Air Force nor alleviate the retention problem. To cover the full spectrum of the needs of the Air Force and to alleviate the rated retention problem, both money and change are required.



FIGURE 8. COMPARISON OF MASLOW'S NEEDS, AIR FORCE NEEDS AND INCENTIVES

HERZBERG

There is a third theory of motivation which establishes the seriousness of the cause for the rated retention problem, called job satisfaction or lack of job satisfaction. That theory is postulated by Frederick Herzberg in his book entitled The Motivation to Work [5] and is referred to as the motivation-hygiene concept of job attitudes. Through his research, Herzberg identified five factors which stood out as strong determiners of job satisfaction. Those

factors were--achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility and advancement--and they appeared to describe man's relationship to what he does. [6] They expressed "his job content, achievement on a task, recognition for task achievement, the nature of the task, responsibility for a task and professional advancement or growth in task capability." [7]

Herzberg also identified five factors involved in job dissatisfaction. These factors were--company policy and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal relations and working conditions. Those factors served only to bring about job dissatisfaction and most often did not lead to positive job attitudes. The job dissatisfiers described an individual's relationship to the environment in which he worked. The dissatisfiers were stated as "the kind of administration and supervision received in doing the job, the nature of interpersonal relationships and working conditions surrounding the job and the effects of salary." [8] Herzberg further postulated from his findings that the factors which led to job dissatisfaction contributed very little to job satisfaction. [9] He called the "satisfier" factors motivators, and the "dissatisfiers", hygiene factors. In order to improve job satisfaction, according to Herzberg's theory, satisfiers and dissatisfiers had to be recognized and considered as independent factors. The two factors were not the obverse of each other. The opposite of job satisfaction was not job dissatisfaction, but NO job satisfaction. If the overall objective were to achieve better job satisfaction, then one must improve those five factors which contributed to job satisfaction and reduce those five factors which

contributed to job dissatisfaction.[10]



FIGURE 9. DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE HERZBERG'S MOTIVATION HYGIENE THEORY

There are three major points to be made from Herzberg's theory. The first has been mentioned. To move toward better job satisfaction, the Air Force must consider both the hygiene factors and the motivators, must improve the environment where the aircrew does his work by removing job dissatisfiers and must improve the work the aircrew does by improving tasks and rewards. (See Figure 9)

The second point, reasons for the rated retention problem expressed by the aircrews themselves, contain job dissatisfiers and inadequate job satisfiers. The Air Force retention problem is not caused by a simple deficit of job satisfiers, or an abundance of job dissatisfiers; both contribute to the problem. Figure 10 illustrates that point. Herzberg's ten factors are shown in boldface type. Those items shown alongside Herzberg's factors are reasons or causes identified by the TAC report.

The third point, two factors identified by Herzberg were conspicuous by their absence from the TAC report. They were INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS, a hygiene factor, and WORK ITSELF, a motivator. That the two items were absent from the report is a positive factor for the Air Force. Interpersonal relations, defined as peer-to-peer or man-to-man relationships, are not a problem within the rated force.



FIGURE 10. CHART OF HERZBERG'S SATISFIERS AND DISSATISFIERS ASSOCIATED WITH REASONS FOR THE RATED RETENTION PROBLEM

NOTE: Herzberg's satisfiers and dissatisfiers are indicated by BOLDFACE type. The lower case items are reasons for the retention problem which were identified by the TAC report. Those items will be opposite to and point toward their Herzberg equivalent.

* Herzberg factors which did not appear in the TAC Aircrew Concerns Report.

Aircrews, because of their psychological makeup, their motivation, their drive, like themselves and like each other. They generally like the officers for whom they work. For whatever reasons, interpersonal relations within the Air Force are not now a cause of the retention problem. Work itself, defined as flying and maintaining the Air Force organization, is also not a problem. Flying is the common denominator which attracted the rated officer to the organization and which holds the rated force together. The Air Force is the organization which offers the individual the opportunity to fly, and for those who stay past an initial commitment it becomes a way of life. Maintaining that way of life, working to improve that organization is not perceived as "Bad Work." Within the Air Force, the work itself, flying and maintaining the organization, is a very positive motivator for the aircrews.

That the two items, interpersonal relations and work itself, were absent from the report is fortunate. It obviously means that the two were not causes for the retention problem, but is far more significant. That the work itself is still a strong motivator and that interpersonal relations does not produce job dissatisfaction are building blocks or stepping stones to correct the retention problem. They provide hope and offer a starting point.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, the author presents the reasons for the rated retention problem in a format called the Organizational Chart. Through the use of the Chart, he graphically depicts and analyzes those reasons. He further analyzes the reasons through the psychological theories of Maslow, Maier and Herzberg.

The Organizational Chart arranges the reasons for the rated retention problem into four major areas: Quality of Life, Personnel Management, Leadership and Management and Combat Capability. It defines lack of job satisfaction as a major cause of the problem and indicates individual and organizational concerns as co-equal causes. Through analogies and graphic analyses using the Organizational Chart, the author indicates that the rated retention problem is complex and intricately interwoven between human and organizational elements.

Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs is presented and is compared with the Air Force needs of Organizational Readiness, Job Satisfaction, Individual Security and Individual Subsistence. The comparison illustrates that the Air Force, as an institution, was unable to satisfy the basic human needs of its rated force during the retention problem.

Maier's psychological theory is presented and defines the relationship between a need and an incentive. The author presents two incentives, money and organizational change, and developes their relationship with the needs precipitated by the rated retention problem. That relationship suggests that money and organizational change will work together to meet the needs of the rated officer and can, therefore, become the incentives which end the rated retention problem.

Herzberg's theory postulates that individuals are motivated to work through two independent factors which he calls satisfiers or motivators and dissatisfiers or hygiene factors. Through association between Herzberg's factors and the reasons for the rated retention problem, the author concludes the retention problem is perpetuated by a lack of motivators and an abundance of dissatisfiers. The author

points out that both factors fuel the problem, but two areas,- Interpersonal Relationships and Work Itself, are not parts of the dissatisfying factors.

CHAPTER V

A SOLUTION

OVERVIEW

There are three presentations offered in this final chapter. The first summarizes the information presented in previous chapters; the second contains conclusions drawn from the thesis concerning the rated retention problem; the third suggests an effective solution for the problem.

SUMMARY

The summary that follows contains data presented and documented in preceding chapters and is reproduced here to clarify and support the conclusions and the solution.

The retention of rated Air Force officers at this close of calendar year 1979 was a significant and potentially critical problem. Retention rates did not meet half the programmed needs and a shortage of over 1300 rated personnel was documented. The Air Force had suffered at least a 1 BILLION dollar loss through reduced retention. Replacement would cost substantially more in the future; would be difficult or impossible without expending time to properly train and gain experience. Air Force morale was low, leadership effectiveness was at an ebb and combat readiness was reduced.

The reasons for the rated retention problem were numerous and intricately interwoven between individual and organizational factors. When grouped and organized, the reasons indicated that job

dissatisfaction, or lack of job satisfaction, was a major, prevailing cause; that concern for individual security and organizational readiness were co-equal and supporting major cuases.

CONCLUSIONS

The prevailing cause for the rated retention problem was a dissatisfaction with the job. The reasons for that dissatisfaction were varied but may be expressed thusly: People did not like their "work" as they experienced it; had been overwhelmed with the demands made by their job; were not compensated by adequate (type and amount) rewards and actively sought change.

There were general conditions which produced the reasons, reinforced the major cause and sustained the rated retention problem. Those conditions within the Air Force were a failure to recognize and cope with changes in individuals and the use of ineffective management practices.

The individual rated officer in 1979 had changed from prior decades but the organization had not recognized that change. The individual was better educated. The individual was at a higher level of technical training and expertise. The individual had a different value system. He possessed a threshold of fiscal security below which the most significant factor of individual concern was "money" to purchase security.

The Air Force had not adequately recognized those changes and that lack of recognition led to inadequate coping with the situation and alienation of the rated officer.

There were significant numbers of management practices within the Air Force organization that were ineffective and contributed to conditions that produced the rated retention problem. These practices existed at each level of command and made working conditions undesireable for the rated force, forced unnecessary, non-productive demands upon the individual and contributed to dissatisfaction. Most importantly, these practices produced intense frustration.

It was generally believed that the ineffective management practices were the result of three leadership problems: politicing, ineptness and overtasking. Some commanders at all levels were perceived to "push the party line", "not make waves", to do more with less to advance their careers. Some commanders reached their levels of command without adequate knowledge or experience and were forced to command without sufficient preparation. At every level there was too much to do and too little to do it with. The result of this overtasking was that commanders seldom had time to reflect and plan. They functioned in a brush-fire management environment. The end product produced by politicing, ineptness and overtasking was ineffective management of the rated force.

A final conclusion produced by this study is that any solution to the rated retention problem must be executed soon and must stop the exodus of the rated force. If the solution is not found soon or if the exodus is not stopped, retention will not be a problem. A more critical problem of force replacement or force reconsitution will replace the retention problem.

A SOLUTION

There are two items that should be included in a solution to the retention problem. First, the exodus of the rated force should be stopped. Second, a fix for the causes of the problem must be found.

STOP THE EXODUS

The quickest and most effective way to stop the rated exodus is with money: pay and salary. Money provides the most efficient, positive means to stop the loss for it is a recognized and accepted incentive. The rated Air Force members need money today more than any time in their career since 1972. Money will alleviate more of their concerns, faster, than any other available incentive. More importantly, money acts as immediate reward and recognition for the job being performed and will maintain or restore motivation, right NOW! Money will retain the experience and the motivation the Air Force needs.

There are limitations to the use of money to stop the exodus. The largest limiting factor is that money is not readily available. Dramatic steps would be necessary to make that money available. The point that must be understood, however, is that spending money to stop the losses is less expensive than replacing the losses. The Air Force cannot purchase experience it needs off the open market; replacement costs in the future will far exceed the dollar value necessary to stop the exodus now.[1]

A second limiting factor, is that money alone will not stop

the exodus, forever. Even with "very substantial" salary increases, rated members will become dissatisfied again if their working conditions and psychological strains are not improved; if the causes and conditions which produced the problem are not removed. If the salary of the aircrew were doubled and the causes and conditions were unchanged, the individual would would be so frustrated in less than two years, that the new salary would not keep him in the Air Force. Money can stop the exodus, but money alone will not keep it stopped.

FIX THE PROBLEM

Once the exodus has been stopped, the conditions, causes and reasons for the retention problem must be fixed. The only effective way to fix the problem is to change those conditions that produce the problem. Change is a recognized necessity.

AUTHOR'S SOLUTION

A solution perceived by the author includes an immediate stop to the exodus by a substantial increase in pay for the rated member; a change to those factors within the organization which cause the retention problem; the establishment of procedures that recognize the value of the rated officers' contribution and bring about necessary additional changes as soon as possible.

What is a substantial increase in pay? How much increase is necessary to stop the rated exodus? Seven and one-half percent is not enough, nor is 10.4%. Increases of that magnitude will not even compensate for the loss of purchasing power which has occured because of the government freezes on military pay. A substantial

increase must be sufficient to compensate for the losses; to restore the motivational effects of salary; to be perceived as just compensation for the efforts expended and recognition of the talent required.

An increase in flight pay to 50% of basic income would be the minimum amount that would assure the exodus of aircrews would stop. Currently flight pay is approximately 14% of basic pay. It was originally conceived to be approximately 50% of base pay, [2] and should have kept pace with the original intent. That change would increase the current flight pay by a factor of four, increase take home pay by $700 per month, increase a Major's income from approximately $26,500 to $38,000 per year. This new annual salary would be competitive with the civilian market, and would be perceived as just pay for the amount and type of work done.

What changes should occur and how should those changes be made? Certain changes have already been recognized and documented. The authority and the procedures to implement them are available, and they should be incorporated immediately. Additional duties and ground training are but two examples. Other changes which need to be made have been documented by this thesis and other studies. To implement those changes will take time but the procedures should be: (1) an immediate recognition, (2) a prioritization to alleviate the worst first, (3) an active, aggressive program to continue identification and change.

EDITORIAL

If the rated retention problem is to be fully solved, there must be a revitalization and recognition of the worth of the Air Force rated officer, both internally within the organization and externally within the nation. The individual must perceive, feel and know his worth through tangible and intangible rewards of the organization and the nation.

Internally the organization must return the individual's prestige; recognize his potential and his assets; remove the barriers that reduce his effectiveness, his prestige and sense of worth; recognize the true value and necessity of the talent/experience/motivation/work of that individual; recognize and utilize the internal motivation of their greatest assets -- the individual.

Externally the nation must recognize the necessity for the military airman; pay for the value of the military protection at "adequate" rates.

FOOTNOTES

FOOT NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. "Iosue: Pilot Retention Rate May Be Leveling Off," Air Force Times, 7 January 1980, p. 3.

2. David R. Griffiths, "Retention of Highly Trained Poses Serious Problem," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 5 November 1979, pp.42-43.

3. Data was presented by TAC/DPRO briefer, Major J. O. McFalls, as part of the TAC/DP information briefing prior to TAC Aircrew Concerns Conference I, 17 October 1978. Percentage rates were not presented, only the trend was identified.

4. "Top Priority - Retention," Air Force Times, 10 March 1980, p. 16.

5. Ivan J. Birrer, Alvin D. Officer, and Phillip J. Brookes, RB 908-1, Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), p. 2-2.

6. Ibid.

7. Appendix A records the report, "Conference on TAC Aircrew Concerns," 17-20 October 1978 in its entire and unedited form.

8. The reports identified are available through respective headquarters. They are protected through "For Official Use Only" restrictions. The Pacific Air Force report, "Commando Jack Report," January 1979 lists 62 action items all of which are addressed by the TAC Aircrew Concerns Conference.

FOOT NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. Two examples of the early indicators which surfaced in 1970 were an article reported by the Air Force Times on 8 April 1970 (p. 17) entitled "Pilot Loss Continues - Gripes Probed;" an article from the Armed Forces Journal by Brooke Nihart, August 1970 (107, p. 21) entitled "Why Junior Officers Get Out."

2. David R. Griffiths, "Retention of Highly Trained Poses Serious Problems," Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 5, 1979, p. 43. Many sources indicate the effects of force drawdown necessitated by the ending of the Vietnam conflict. One summary was reported by a "top Air Force official" in the article indicated. That official explained that from a Vietnam peak in 1968 through 1977, the Air Force cut the size of the active force by 37% and transferred some millions to the Guard and Reserve. Individuals were actively encouraged to get out.

3. "Air Force Battles Exodus of Pilots," Air Force Times, 14 August 1978, p. 2.

4. The exact broadcast dates of the original stories were not available to the author nor are they significant to the thesis. The events were broadcasted from August to September 1978. It is important to recognize the source and essence of the major stories. CBS News with Walter Cronkite reported five segments on the plight of the US military during its prime time report. One of those segments dealt with the rated officer retention problem (reported as "potentially significant") experienced by the US Navy and Air Force. CBS magazine of the air, 60 Minutes, reported on the combat readiness of the Americna military machine and recognized the reduction in rated officer retention as a degradation of that readiness. NBC News also did a report on the military. Their report was not significantly different than CBS'.

5. Letter publisehd in its entirety in APPENDIX B.

6. HQ AFMPC/MPCF, "Officer Retention Group Briefing," (general briefing prepared by the Officer Retention Group, Headquarters Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, Texas, January 1980), slide no. 4.

7. Captain Jerry Ballard, "Update of Pilot/Nav RDTM Continuation Rates," (point talking paper, Headquarters AFMPC/MPCROR, 25 February 1980), pp. 1 and 6.

8. Dollar value of $800,000 is an estimate based on the following data:

TRAINING COST FACTORS

Acquisition (USAFA/ROTC/OTS Aug)	$ 45,790
Undergraduate Pilot Training	238,801
Survival (Water/Basic)	4,304
Squadron Officer Training	11,821
Simulator Training(2 yrs @ 32 hrs @$65.31 hr)	4,180
*Initial Weapons Qualification	490,000

*NOTE: Initial Weapons Qualification is an estimate of an average for all aircraft in the Air Force inventory and is based on representative cost as follows: C-141, $1,020,000. Melvin Laird in his article from Armed Forces Journal, March 1980 (see end note 14, Chapter 3) estimates the "cost of training a pilot is in excess of $700,000."

9. Colonel Joseh W. Ashy and Colonel James S. Allen, "The Fighter Pilot Shortfall: An Examination of the Problem and Alternative Solutions," (Research Report, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1979), p. 9.

10. HQ AFMPC/MPCF, "What's Needed at the CORONA Level," (talking paper prepared to advise Pentagon officials on rated prioritization), November 1979.

FOOT NOTES

CHAPTER III

1. General Creech assumed command of the Tactical Air Command on 1 May 1978.

2. Interviews with Captain Albert P. Richards, Action Officer, TAC/DPRO, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Virginia, 17 October 1978; Lieutenant Colonel Philip Nuber, Command Officer Rated Personnel Assignment, TAC/DPRO, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Virginia, 15 April 1979.

3. Interview with Major Don Rakestraw, Action Officer Rated Personnel Assignment (TAC/DPR), Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Virginia, 4 October 1978.

4. Information and quotations extracted from tasking message out of Headquarters Tactical Air Command. The office of primary responsibility (OPR) was TAC/DP, date-time-group was 042327Z October 1978.

5. Information was provided by Major Don Rakestraw, TAC/DPR during telephonic request for attendance to TAC Aircrew Concerns Conference, 25 September 1978.

6. The aircrew members who attended the TAC conference were affectionally labelled, by their peers, "The Dirty Thirty." The "handle" was a reference to the movie The Dirty Dozen; to an impossible tasking similar in size to that accomplished by the dirty dozen; to a perceived fate similar to that encountered by the dirty dozen. The name suggested a bit of humor interjected by the affected group, but it recognized the magnitude of the problem and the low probability of immediate success.

7. The names, ranks, home stations and Air Force positions for those individuals who participated in TAC Aircrew Concerns Conference I are presented in APPENDIX C.

8. The characteristics attributed to the three leaders are provided by observations and subjective evaluation by the author. The general concensus of the Concerns Conference I was that the men provided adequate guidance and situational awareness without dominating.

9. These were facts that became obvious as the Conference progressed. It should be pointed out that the Headquarters, TAC/DP staff was working under broad guidelines themselves. That TAC and the Commander had ample reason to be uncertain of expectations, and therefore, uncertain of procedures.

10. Facts recounted from author's participation in and observations of TAC Aircrew Concerns Conference I.

11. IBID.

12. Conference on TAC Aircrew Concerns (Langley AFB, Virginia: Headquarters Tactical Air Command, 1978) p. 1. Hereafter referred to as APPENDIX A. The purposes ascribed, by General Creech, to the conference were "to provide.....another avenue of communication with TAC aircrews" and "...to obtain a representative cross section of (TAC) aircrew views..." The major accomplishment of the conference was to meet face to face with General Creech and "tell it like it is." General Creech's directives were to disseminate the written report to the field "to stimulate further aircrew discussion..," and "to provide insight and assistance to supervisors at all levels."

13. General Creech's concerns were genuine, extremely deep and well founded. They were expressed to Colonel Van Christiansen, leader of the TAC conference. Colonel Christiansen and the author of this thesis composed the first draft of the Introduction. The Introduction was rewritten four times and the General himself made final word changes to ensure it truly expressed his concerns.

    Those concerns are expressed as follows: The report should not give an unfavorable impression to the aircrews, to their commanders or to the public. It should not appear that the aircrews are "running" TAC. It must be clear that the commander listened and understood; that the commander is deeply concerned. The report should not give false hope that the commander can entirely fix the problems, immediately. It must convey the fact that there have to be continued efforts and continued concern.

14. Melvin R. Laird, "People, Not Hardware/The Highest Defense Budget Priority," Armed Forces Journal, Vol 117, No. 8 (March 1980), p. 62.

15. IBID., p. 63.

FOOT NOTES

CHAPTER IV

1. Maslow, A. H., Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper, 1954.
2. Maier, Norman R. F., Psychology in Industrial Organizations, Fourth Edition. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), pg. 335-336.
3. IBID., p. 330.
4. IBID., p. 357.
5. Herzberg, Frederick, The Motivation to Work. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959).
6. Herzberg, Frederick, Work and the Nature of Man. (New York: World Publishing Company, 1966), pg. 72-73.
7. IBID., p. 74.
8. IBID., p. 73.
9. IBID., p. 77
10. IBID., p. 76.

FOOT NOTES

CHAPTER V

1. "Top Priority - Retention,"Air Force Times, 10 March 1980, p. 16. Comments by Joseph C. Zengerler, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower Reserve Affairs and Installations, in testimony before House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel, March 1980.

2. Headquarters Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center (AFMPC). "Flight Pay Increase Update." Point paper prepared for AFMPC/MPCF, Randolph AFB, Texas, June 1979.

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6. Headquarters Pacific Air Command, Hickam AFB, HW. "Commando Jack Report," 15 January 1979. For Official Use Only report printed by Headquarters Pacific Air Command.

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   "Top Priority - Retention," 10 March 1980.

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12. Laird, Melvin R. "People, Not Hardware/The Highest Defense Budget Priority." Armed Forces Journal Vol. 117, No. 8 (March 1980), p. 62.

13. Nihart, Brooke. "Why Junior Officers Get Out." Armed Forces Journal Vol. 107 (August 1970), p. 21.

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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

INTRODUCTION

To provide still another avenue of communication with TAC aircrews, the TAC Commander convened a conference of unit aircrew representatives at Headquarters TAC, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, on 17 October 1978. The aircrew conferees were from throughout TAC and included representatives from all of the Command's weapon systems and rated specialties. The purpose of the conference was to obtain a representative cross section of aircrew views on such subjects as readiness issues, career "irritants", and management practices in general as they impact on aircrew morale, motivation, and career orientation. In addition to general "quality of life" perceptions and issues, the aircrew representatives were asked to provide specific recommendations regarding ground training and additional duties.

During the course of the conference, the TAC Commander met with the group and provided each conferee, in turn, ample opportunity to present his comments directly. Before their departure on 20 October, the conferees drafted the attached report, returned to their units with the working draft, and called in some additions.

The aircrews were challenged to "tell it like it is" -- as they see it. They did so. The report, therefore, does not attempt to present other factors bearing on these issues. Neither is it necessarily all-inclusive regarding aircrew views. Accordingly, a follow-up conference will be held in approximately forty-five days to provide additional opportunity for TAC aircrews to present their ideas and recommendations.

The Commander has directed that this report be disseminated to the field to stimulate further aircrew discussion and ideas -- and to provide insight and assistance to supervisors at all levels.

A. ADDITIONAL DUTIES

1. PROBLEM: Excessive additional duties within today's squadrons cause an extreme hardship for aircrews. Nonmission-related duties take up valuable time that should be spent in tactical study and combat preparation. Aircrews feel a deep frustration when confronted with relatively needless tasks in nonmission-related duties. This frustration is highlighted because aircrews feel that OERs are written primarily on additional duties. Previous efforts to reduce/eliminate nonmission-oriented additional duties have generally been unsuccessful. In spite of recent command directives, the additional duty issue continues to degrade the combat capability of the TAF.

a. The additional duty workload reduces aircrew time available for primary duty.

b. Lack of action and/or integrity on the part of unit commanders to reduce additional duties and comply with reduction directives is a major factor in aircrew career retention.

2. RECOMMENDATION: TAC/CC support implementation of proposals incorporated in the "additional duty package" currently being staffed by TAC/DOOT. This package, which lists the relatively few additional duties to be performed, will provide aircrews the much needed reduction in extra duty hours now expended and enable them to spend the majority of their time on mission-related tasks.

B - GROUND TRAINING

1. PROBLEM: The present ground training for aircrews is unacceptable. Primary reasons are:

a. Current requirements do not properly reflect aircrew needs for improved combat capability.

b. Numbers of ground training requirements, in association with additional duties and flying training requirements, have overtasked and overtaxed the aircrews.

c. There is no control for ground training proliferation. The multiplicity of inputs and the continually additive nature of requirements have produced an unacceptable system.

2. RECOMMENDATION:

a. To correct problems in the ground training program, HQ TAC should establish an office of primary responsibility to manage the total ground training program. New or additive ground training requirements should be approved by this office.

b. TAC OPR should develop a total ground training program and a single-source document which would identify and correlate all Air Force and TAC-directed aircrew ground training requirements. The single-source document and an OPR management program should insure that training requirements are reduced to the minimum practicable level.

c. TAC should request that all TAC units review current ground training requirements and determine which are necessary for accomplishment of the unit mission. TAC units should forward both the current ground training requirements and the reduced list to HQ TAC OPR.

d. Recommend that a field working group be convened to help TAC evaluate the unit inputs to define total TAC ground training requirements.

e. Recommendations for training requirements presently contained in TACM 51-50 follow. These recommendations only address ground training requirements contained in TACM 51-50 and those known or confirmed by units represented at the conference. It was beyond the scope of this group to compile all regulations and training requirements for units within TAC.

(1) TTS training (verification).

(a) Deconflict requirements between TSS/Area Certification/Verification and consolidate under new program called Checkered Flag.

(b) Expand to include COMSEC training requirement.

(2) Egress/hanging harness -maintain 90-day requirement.

(3) Wet Drill - reduce to once every 3 years after initial training.

(4) Global survival.

(a) Delete except for initial training at Fairchild.

(b) Video-tape refresher for area of concern only prior to deployment.

(5) Disaster preparedness - once per base; accomplish one time per PCS

(6) Human relations.

(a) Present program adequate.

(b) Flight surgeons cover drug/alcohol during aircrew safety meeting as needed.

(7) COMSEC training - requirement should be included in Checkered Flag training.

(8) Aerobics.

(a) Delete yearly testing for aircrew members.

(b) Commanders will actively support physical activities for aircrews and should monitor through annual physicals.

(9) Small arms - initial .38 training only. Delete refresher training for aircrews.

(10) Altitude chamber - no change.

(11) Intelligence training - as determined by squadron and verified by wing.

(12) Area certification - incorporated in Checkered Flag.

(13) Weapons training - all training determined by wing staff or squadron - inflight accomplishments meet ground requirements.

(14) Nuc/Missile school - determined by wing/DOW.

(15) Pop-up training film.

(a) Make new film.

(b) Once during initial training in each new weapon system during RTU.

(16) Simulator.

(a) Experienced (IAW TACM 51-50) crews need only 6 hours per each 6-month period.

(b) Individual unit may increase requirement for inexperienced crews.

(c) Simulator should be operated only as necessary. Delete the policy of operating the simulator a specified number of hours per day to support UTE rates. The operational day for the simulator will be reduced to reflect a maximum of a 10-hour crew duty day.

f. All ground training must be incorporated with flying training requirements, and all requirements combined should not task the aircrew more than 50 hours per week for normal day-to-day training.

C. IRRITANTS

1. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT/ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM.

a. OVERVIEW: The present personnel system is not responsive to the needs of the aircrews, particularly to those who desire to remain in primary flying or flying-related assignments; control over our careers is extremely limited. Many decisions affecting our careers

appear to be arbitrary and indiscriminate with little or no long-range planning or consideration of our desires. There is insufficient, inadequate participation by the individual in his assignment and career progression pattern.

b. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) PROBLEM: Commitements assigned for various aircraft upgrade programs appear to be inconsistent and not representative of the dollar value cost of the training program. In addition, the individual often is not allowed to operate the aircraft for the period for which it has been committed.

Cost	System	Committment	Time in Assignment
$560,000	F-4 RTU	4 Yrs	2-2.5 year assignment
$100,000	0-2/OV-10 RTU	3 Yrs	3+ year assignment

Requalification in F-4 RTU short course adds additional 2-year committment.

(2) PROBLEM: Fighter or TAC pilots in less desirable flying assignments - ATC, fighter lead-in, FAC/ALO, RTU IP, staff positions - should be compensated by varied (shorter) tour lengths and special consideration for follow-on assignments. Presently, the only special consideration appears to be given to pilots coming from staff/personnel assignments. This would encourage people to volunteer for these less desirable assignments since they can "see the light at the end of the tunnel."

RECOMMENDATION: Directed duty assignment or follow-on assignment to designated weapon system; i.e., give "dues paying assignment" and follow-on assignment on same set of orders.

(3) PROBLEM: Short-notice "fall out assignments" are unacceptable, particularly following controlled tours. Present system appears to stronlgy resemble crisis management with all its inherent drawbacks.

RECOMMENDATION: The personnel managers should plan ahead and eliminate the present lack of planning, programming, and participation.

(4) PROBLEM: The use of remote/long tour return dates as a major criterion for conversion to new aircraft appears inequitable since FAIP and UPT graduates do not have to meet this criterion.

(5) PROBLEM: Present use of Form 90 for assignment matching is unacceptable.

RECOMMENDATION: Personnel managers should present available choices to aircrews to enable them to participate in assignment selection when Form 90 choices are not available.

(6) RECOMMENDATION: A critical review of a zero-based nature should be conducted to determine realistic nonmainstream staff/nonflying jobs requiring fighter expertise.

(7) RECOMMENDATION: Develop mainstream career progression within flying duties. The flow must provide a competitive posture for selection to Regular and promotion. The proposed route would be a minimum of two operational assignments within the TAF. Selection for RTU IP duty would be from the most highly qualified operational IPs. Limiting these tours to 2 years maximum (voluntary extension permissible) and selecting the preponderance of FWS instructors from

this source would establish RTU IP duty as a stepping stone for promotion and increased job responsibility.

(8) PROBLEM: Presently some people have time on station periods in excess of 4 years while other equally qualified personnel at the same base are involuntarily rotated in minimum time.

RECOMMENDATION: Time-on-station constraints should be consistent.

(9) PROBLEM: The current attitude among many TACS users is that the system is in a degraded state of combat readiness. The system's ability to effectively do its job and to take its place in a major conflict is seriously questioned. Much of the equipment in use is antiquated and the TACS system lacks the professionally experienced personnel resources upon which to base new programs. There is no skeleton or framework of highly experienced TACS personnel who have remained in the system. It appears that men, money, and command emphasis have not kept pace with the demands of the system. To complicate the manpower problem within the TACS, there is a common attitude among fighter pilots that a TACS assignment is not personally satisfying or conducive to an Air Force career. Many pilots believe the jobs of FAC/ALO or TACS staff lack challenge, are degrading, and are a definite misuse of a vital asset -- the fighter pilot. Aircraft and ground equipment used are seen as outdated and do little to even maintain the fighter pilot skills necessary to return to the profession. Some pilots also perceive the TACS as a dumping ground for deferred officers, and many of its middle-level managers are seen as less than competent. This perception fosters extreme frustration and demotivation for pilots selected for TACS assignments and introduces difficult manning problems. However, the major frustration for the TACS pilot lies in attempts to convince the customer that the TACS is responsive and vital. Often, because of deficiencies within the TACS, the support provided is less than satisfactory or does not fully meet the demands of the user. For example, in some cases, Army requests for live ordnance deliveries in the peacetime training environment have taken as much as 21 days. The TACS system is in vital need of restructuring or abolition in favor of a more responsive and effective system.

RECOMMENDATION:Dual qualification should be considered within the air-to-ground and air-to-air communities. A-10, A-7, and air-to-ground dedicated F-4, F-16 pilots could easily be checked out in the O-2/OV-10, thereby providing an in-house FAC force and removing the stigma of 3-year FAC tours and its separation/isolation from fighter tactics, expertise and credibility. F-15, F-16, and F-4 air-to-air dedicated pilots could be dual qualified in the F-5 or T-38 and provide a local cadre for DACT aggressor training.

(10) PROBLEM: The high number of FAIPs going directly to our new weapon systems has generated widespread dissatisfaction with the assignment process. TAC pilots see that their future holds FAC/ALO and RTU IP duty, then maybe cross training, if they can manage to update their remote/overseas return dates. It is very difficult to watch the FAIPs move into the "prime" aircraft without a feeling of being let down. The loss of experience and investment for tactical aviation as a result of the FAIP program needs to be weighed in the equation. With a force structure requiring a quality force, bona fide fighter experience has a high value which cannot recouped easily. FAIPs enter the TAF with

high flying time and rank which puts them in areas of leadership/ flying responsibility where fighter expertise is needed. Combat capability suffers because these "fighter pilots" do not have the broad base of tactical expertise to rely upon in making decisions/innovative tactical suggestions.

(11) PROBLEM: Personnel rotating from staff duty to fill rank requirements within operational units (Sqdn Cmdr, Ops Off, Flight Cmdr) do not have, and in many cases, do not attain current knowledge and understanding of the threat, tactics, etc. Their experience is dated and many have not been in the cockpit for 3-5 years. They cannot quickly generate the degree of tactical respect required to be an effective leader. Due to their total time and previous fighter time, these people rapidly flow into critical areas such as Flt Cmdr, Stan/Eval, Ops Officer, and others.

RECOMMENDATION: The development of a special refresher or step-up course aimed specifically at these personnel should be considered. At the present time, RTU IPs and rotating staff officers who return to tactical operations also have dated tactical knowledge and unhoned flying skills. Couple these "supervisors" with the FAIP who has flown a fighter for 6 months and is now an "experienced" fighter pilot, and the squadron on paper has optimum rank, experience, and flying time, but in reality, combat capability is significantly degraded. The fighter experience level in the squadron is too low and the present measuring criterion is not satisfactory.

(12) PROBLEM: Closed-loop systems restrict people in the F-4G, F-5, F-105, F-111, and RF-4C.

RECOMMENDATION: "Cross-fertilization" of aircrews among TAF aircraft be established as a part of personnel assignment/ career development policy.

(13) PROBLEM: The few "many-motor" people in TAC are not controlled by TAC assignments but classified as MPC assets.

RECOMMENDATION: Some of these people should be allowed to cross train to fill FAC/Fighter assignments, if desired.

(14) PROBLEM: Due to conversion to single-seat fighters, the future for WSOs appears uncertain. Although Air Force needs may exist in the multi-engine aircraft, many WSOs do not feel this duty meets their personal goals.

RECOMMENDATION: Increase the selection rate for UPT of WSOs from fighter and recce forces. Let wing commanders have inputs in the WSO/UPT selection process, raise the entry age waiver limit, and substitute realistic physical examination criterion for WSOs already on flying status.

(15) RECOMMENDATION: Revise the OER format. Make it relate to a particular job specialty. The rater should write the OER based on primary flying duties, and how well the ratee performs that primary job. (Maybe we will require different forms based on RPI positions.) This would eliminate OERs being written on additional duties.

(16) RECOMMENDATION: Eliminate the up or out promotion system. Develop a career technical force (dual-track system). Specify a career point where an individual chooses to either continue flying or remain competitive for promotion/career progression. Allow those who

just want to fly to remain in operations. Develop a separate financial/career progression system for them. This would prevent them from having all the key supervisor positions and enable the career officer to receive proper management/leadership experience. Upon reconvening, the group should consider a promotion system based upon a dual-track career or fully-qualified status.

(17) RECOMMENDATION: Select aircrews with air-to-air expertise to work in air-to-air related nonmainstream and staff assignments and apply the same selection to air-to-ground assignments.

2. LEADERSHIP

a. OVERVIEW: Many aircrews expressed lack of confidence in commanders and supervisors at all levels. Many are unable to competently lead flights in accomplishing the unit mission. The respect and loyalty due them is thus reduced. The following perceptions contribute.

b. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) PROBLEM: Tactical fighter aircrews are professionals and desire to be treated as such. Certain requirements (Golden Flow drug testing, supervised bold face exams, static display uniform inspections, etc.) lower self-esteem and diminish the perceived status of the tactical aircrew. The general trend to "punish" the majority for the actions of a few should cease. Aircrews are becoming increasingly intolerant of those requirements which effectively treat them as children.

RECOMMENDATION: Examine and eliminate all requirements which decrease self-esteem.

(2) PROBLEM: The need to decentralize management and return decision making to appropriate levels is apparent. Numbered Air Force and TAC supplements to various regulations are commonly more restrictive and require decisions be made at higher headquarters that should be made by the wing commander. Specific examples are approval for fly-bys at home stations, approval for landing at cross-country bases without a barrier, and composite force training requests.

RECOMMENDATION: Thoroughly review all TAC and NAF regulations/report requirements. The objective of the review should be to return appropriate decision making to the wing level.

(3) PROBLEM: Most aircrews perceive that "this is a one mistake Air Force" and that one mistake will virtually end their careers.

(4) PROBLEM: Excessive length of time to effect change in the system makes it appear that the system is unresponsive to change. The NAF is seen to be a hindrance to effective communication between the wing staff and the TAC staff. Most aircrews believe that the NAF is not needed in TAC.

RECOMMENDATION: Investigate feasibility of eliminating NAF from TAC. If not feasible, recommend that the NAF monitor and assist only and not restrict individual wing operations.

(5) PROBLEM: Leadership is lacking in many wings at the highest level (CC/DO). Four areas seem to contribute to the wing leadership problem.

(a) Senior service schools put emphasis on making efficient managers and not dynamic leaders. Junior officers perceive wing commanders can manage resources but cannot lead their wings into combat.

(b) Too often, the wing commander and director of operations have been out of tactical aviation for extended periods prior to their command assignment. These extended staff assignments may be valuable for career progression but make the newly assigned wing commander tactically out of date and often unable to catch up with current tactics or exercise the required combat leadership of his wing.

(c) A contributing factor in the commander's lack of knowledge and interest in his wing's combat capability is the fact that he is overtasked which gives him little time to fly and interact with his squadrons. Wing commanders or DOs too seldom visit squadrons to talk about their mission capability. Human relations, drug abuse, FOD meetings, etc., require too much of the commander's time.

(d) A final problem in the wing leadership is one of oversupervision. The commander supervises his DO too closely, therefore, the DO supervises the squadron too closely leaving the squadron commander with the responsibility but no authority. Some examples of the lack of squadron commander authority are:

1. He cannot approve X-C itineraries and cannot control his people once on X-C.

2. When his crews perform static displays it is above his authority to inpsect his men (if an inspection is even necessary.)

3. When weather is marginal, the squadron commander does not have the authority to recall his crews or stop their departures wihtout DO/CC approval; however, if his crews experience difficulties, he is responsible for their action.

(6) PROBLEM: Squadron leadership, primarily commanders and ops officers, detracts from the motivation and job satisfaction of their rated officers for three reasons - insufficient authority and decision-making opportunity at squadron level, leadership's inability or unwillingness to insulate unit personnel from outside tasking, and oversupervision at squadron level.

(a) The squadron commander's apparent lack of authority is a strong demotivator for the younger rated officers. They observe their commander being required to obtain higher approval for many flying operations performed in the course of squadron mission accomplishment.

(b) The squadron commander is unable or unwilling to limit the tasking on squadron personnel. The "can do" ethic is viewed as a monster stipulating that virtually every task arriving at the squadron will be accomplished by someone. Many squadrons are repeatedly tasked to provide accident board participants, line of duty investigation officers, etc., when they cannot afford to lose the people. If the squadron commander attempts to resist the action, he invariably loses. Commanders that say, "no", and make it stick are rare.

(c) Squadron leadership complies with and often supports operating practices that undermine the self-esteem of the rated officers. Examples are: mandatory urinalysis testing, supervised bold face examinations, an overemphasis of AFR 35-10 when compared to interest in an individual's mission capability, and the removal of beer from the squadron.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) Reevaluate all operations decisions currently being made above squadron level. Relocate all possible decision points to squadron levels. Adequately explain the need for all decisions not relocated. The results will be that squadron commanders will again be leaders; younger officers will again respect and aspire to the position; and the squadron will experience less turbulence and inconsistency in its operations.

(b) TAC/CC communicate and support the philosophy that squadron commanders are the experts on the proper utilization of their people, and that their decisions should be followed to the maximum extent possible. A commander who mismanages his people must be replaced. A squadron commander should document each case where his decision was not followed. The record of these actions should be a subject of higher headquarters IG inspections.

(c) As this problem addresses the basic leadership principle of supporting one's followers and exercising confidence in them, no specific recommendation is appropriate.

c. SUMMARY: The problems listed above detract from the rated officers' quality of life and job satisfaction through poor leadership. Many officers perceive that the commanders are forced into these modes of operation by heavy workload pressures from above and a complex bureaucratic organization that stifles communication and resists change. Consequently, officers no longer see a command billet as being a worthy goal. They visualize themselves as squadron commanders with no authority to lead their men; as wing commanders or DOs who are tactically outdated, overtasked, and unable to lead a combat capable wing. The young pilot, therefore, sees no future or goal for himself in the Air Force.

3. REPORTING SYSTEM.

a. OVERVIEW: Many indicators and reports used by HHQ drive practices at wing level, but do not adequately depict combat capability, management effectiveness, or real situations. Use of these indicators and reports results in "lying to ourselves and our bosses," lowers the prestige of commanders, and raises the question of integrity in the system.

b. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) PROBLEM: Maintenance Indicators:

(a) Reports of aircraft tail number deviations and additions/deletions do not adequately reflect routine maintenance practices, nor operational aircrew upheavals caused by these maintenance practices.

(b) Utilization rates and sortie production reports do not adequately reflect the quality of operational training provided or maintenance combat capability. For example, a late range sortie produced by maintenance is a counter, even though the aircrew lost part of the scheduled range time or perhaps was unable to train for a type of weapons delivery because of an inoperative/degraded system. In still another example, a cross-country sortie does not equate to a DACT training sortie, yet we pressure aircrews to fly weekend X-C sorties (some without pay or compensation) to meet utilization rates.

(2) PROBLEM: Operational Indicators: An aircrew manning report can identify an RTU wing at 100% of authorized when the wing has

15% of its IP force inefficiently trained, is heavily tasked by HHQ, etc. -- in actuality, the wing is less than 85% manned.

(3) PROBLEM: Communications/Reporting Efficiency. Established channels of communication/reporting lack efficiency and effectiveness. Aircrews generally believe that their channels of communication upward are limited or nonexistent, and that leaders don't know or are improperly told about their concerns or their combat capability. Bureaucratic practices which contribute to the problem are:

(a) Redundancy in reporting requirements creates needless duplication of work and contributes to poor coordination among recipient agencies.

(b) "Overreporting", an outgrowth of oversupervision and micro-management, reflects mistrust for unit leadership.

(c) Lack of timeliness frequently causes personal hardship and lost opportunities for both individuals and units.

(d) Ineffective reporting which looks at inappropriate indicators as a measurement of unit capability/performance (see (1) above).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) Eliminate overreporting and redundancy in reporting.

(b) Ensure that channels of communication, both up and down, are open and receptive to unit needs. Communication processes must become responsive in timeliness and effectiveness.

(c) Reevaluate current reporting indicators. Ensure they reflect situations and conditions that realistically depict combat capabilities and management effectiveness.

4. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY.

a. OVERVIEW: Maintenance problems and practices contribute to aircrew dissatisfaction and reduced aircrew combat capability. TAC aircrews must have more high quality sorties in order to enhance combat capability. Simply stated, the aircrews need to fly more, and when they do fly, the systems need to function properly.

b. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) PROBLEM:

(a) Some maintenance practices and philosophies often provide aircrews with degraded weapon systems that detract from training objectives. It is perceived that aircraft are flown to meet maintenance reporting criteria rather than aircrew training requirements.

(b) Surge practices inhibit training. They compact and intensify flying training with little regard for training requirements or individual aircrew flying requirements, allow little time for constructive debriefings, and require excessively long duty days.

(c) Late maintenance deliveries and noncrew ready aircraft waste valuable aircrew manhours, contribute to long duty days, and foster aircrew and maintenance discontent.

(2) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) The Air Force should raise the annual flying training requirements for TAC aircrews and provide the resources for maintenance to support that training.

(b) Stop the practice of maintenance "wagging" operations' tail. Improve maintenance response to operational requirements.

Stop allowing deviations and maintenance report indicators to degrade or reduce combat training.

(c) Move back to squadron maintenance to improve morale and enhance communications.

(d) Allow operational supervisors and aircrews more latitude to determine utilization of degraded weapon systems and reduce noneffective sorties.

(e) Provide more effective (quality and quantity) flying time.

5. OVERSUPERVISION.

a. PROBLEM: The amount of testing required by aircrews is excessive. Aircrew members are tested by stan/eval, NAF, TAC. In certain units, testing is done each week by stan/eval plus the weekly bold face.

RECOMMENDATION: Abolish supervised bold face written examinations. Reduce the frequency of written bold face examinations and the frequency and types of general testing. Develop and incorporate emergency procedures training similar to the F-15 IPC training into existing airframe programs.

b. PROBLEM: Supervisor of Flying (SOF). Weekend duty for a SOF is unnecessary when aircraft leave/arrive on cross-country missions.

RECOMMENDATION: Eliminate requirement for SOF on weekends to monitor cross-country flights. TAC aircraft make many stops at other bases between departure and return to home station without SOF participation.

c. PROBLEM: Policy of utilizing rated personnel (i.e., pilots in RSU extends duty hours to an unacceptable level. Invariably, a pilot is tasked with a tour in RSU followed by a flight simulator, ground training, or other scheduled event or events that amount to a 12-hour plus duty day.

RECOMMENDATION: RSUs should be manned by qualified NCOs. We cite the utilization of NCOs by our sister services plus several of our allies. We also feel that the need for night RSU is not warranted. Gear checks at night can only be made by sighting of the gear light, which can be accomplished by SOF/tower personnel.

d. PROBLEM: Excessive supplementing of higher headquarters regulations causes excessive restructions when the regulation finally gets to the crew members. Numbered Air Force, wing, and squadron supplements often restrict each other further with the end result of many more restrictions than when the basic regulation started.

RECOMMENDATION: Supplement only when necessary. Prior coordination between MAJCOM, Numbered Air Force, and wing should reduce the requirement for excessive supplements. Drafts of regulations should be sent to the users, i.e., wings/squadrons for review prior to final publication.

6. QUALITY OF TRAINING.

a. PROBLEM: RTU and lead-in instructors are unfamiliar with current tactics and threat scenarios.

RECOMMENDATION: Modify PFT to program IP continuation training/Red Flag participation on a regular basis. As a minimum, each IP should participate in Red Flag annually.

b. PROBLEM: With the exception of the new state of the art simulators, simulators do not adequately simulate aircraft capabilities and are useful only for emergency procedure review. Many simulators do not even have the same equipment found in the aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: Evaluate those simulator missions that cannot be effectively flown and remove them from the training program. Emphasis should be placed on emergency procedure review when the capabilities of the simulator will not support other missions. Simulators should be used only for training requirements, and should not be operated 16 hours per day regardless of requirements.

7. QUALITY OF LIFE.

a. PROBLEM: Long duty days.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Mandatory compensatory time off for alert crews.

(2) Reduce additional duties/ground training.

(3) Return to squadron maintenance - idea being to improve aircraft turn times to reduce flying day and increase flying time.

(4) Wing CC take leadership role in reducing funnel effect of tasking (external and internal).

(5) Establish the TAC standard maximum crew duty day as 10 hours with the minimum crew rest period of 14 hours. The total crew duty hours for a one-week period should be a maximum of 50 hours. These restrictions can be waived by the wing CC for certain necessary missions such as high flights, deployments, exercises, ORIs, etc. These restrictions will not be waived for normal training missions. Track this standard workweek as done with current daily/weekly utilization rates forwarded to HHQ.

b. PROBLEM: Most extended TDYs/higher headquarters exercises have been tasked months ahead, but invariably last minute tasking is made for wings to supply rated staff duty officers. These crew members then have very little time to prepare for an extended separation, e.g., family ties, etc. Usually the workload at the exercise is only enough for one person, but often several crew members are tasked.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Aircrew tasking for TDYs/exercises/schools should be made well in advance, especially for those exercises where dates have been established well in advance.

(2) Many exercises specify a pilot for staff duty which could be filled equally well by a WSO.

c. PROBLEMS: Pay and benefits are decreasing.

(1) Pay "caps" are below current inflation rate.

(2) President's Pay Commission causes uncertainty over future retirement benefits.

(3) GI Bill ends in 1989.

(4) Medical treatment for dependents is inadequate.

(a) CHAMPUS Program is very stringent and bureaucratic.

(b) Dental care for dependents is virtually nonexistent.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Educate the President and Congress on the impact of pay caps and retirement changes.

(2) Provide commercial group medical/dental plan for dependents/retirees. Eliminate CHAMPUS.

(3) Increase amount and quality of medical staff and equipment (to include filling specialty areas).

d. PROBLEM: The aircrews perceive that their only reward for a job well done is no punishment.

RECOMMENDATION: Rate, recognize, and reward aircrew members based on flying performance. Recognition could be given as days off for jobs well done, commander input for next assignment, selection for the next "good deal", etc.

e. PROBLEM: Fighter aircrew prestige and esprit de corps has been reduced.

(1) Centralization (elevation) of authority has reduced the self-pride that formerly accompanied achievement of special flight status (i.e., flight lead, IP/IWSO, lead WSO, etc.).

(2) There is a general perception that support agencies do not share an interest in/concern for the unit's flying mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Squadron CC should have approval authority for X-C flights and itinerary changes.

(2) Provide funds to improve squadron facilities (adequate office space, Zerox, WANG computers, telephones, etc.).

(3) Pay per diem for cross-country flights involving continuation training and fund rental cars for TDY aircrews when convenient transportation is unavailable.

(4) Wing CCs or TT CCs should establish clear-cut priorities for support agencies.

(5) Reinstitute authorization for squadron fly-bys.

(6) Reestablish bar rules, bells, flight suits (sleeves up), beer in squadron, etc.

f. PROBLEM: The Officers' Club has ceased to be a rendezvous point for flyers to discuss flying techniques and problems. Much of this stems from long duty days which leave little time left over even for family activities. Another reason is the overreaction by some of our leaders to activities within the Club. For instance, the forbidding of the term "Dead Bug" within the Club, removal of bells in the bar, and elimination of flight suits in certain clubs have caused a serious dent in esprit de corps.

RECOMMENDATION: Restore the club as a focal point for aircrew meetings by eliminating unnecessary restrictions to club use by its members.

f. PROBLEM: Support facilities do not adequately support aircrew members' needs nor give priority to support flying mission requirements.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend support agencies be responsive and give priority to aircrew members' needs. Recommend a sign for aircrew members be placed in CBPO, credit unions, etc. (i.e., sign "Aircrew Members in Flight Suits Move to the Head of the Line").

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

Dear Boss,

Well, I quit. I've finally run out of drive or devotion or rationalization or whatever it was that kept me in the Air Force this long. I used to believe in, "Why not the best," but I can't keep the faith any longer. I used to fervently maintain that this was, "My Air Force," as much or more than any senior officer's - but I can't believe any more; the light at the end of my tunnel went out. Why you ask? Why leave flying fighters and a promising career? Funny you should ask - mainly I'm resigning because I'm tired. Ten years and 2000 hours in a great fighter, and all the time I've been doing more with less - and I'm tired of it. CBPO doesn't do more with less; they cut hours. I can't even trust CBPO to have my records accurately transcribed to MPC. I have to go to Randolph to make sure my records aren't switched. Finance doesn't do more with less; they cut hours, and service, and are rude to my dependents to boot. Maintenance doesn't do more with less; they MTD and SUD and take 2.5 to turn a clean bird. Everybody but the fighter pilot has figured out the problem; the fact that you can't do more with less - you do less. (And everybody but fighter pilots get away with it - when's the last time the head of CBPO was fired because a man's records were a complete disaster?... and on the other side, when was the last time anyone in the fighter game told higher headquarters, "We can't hack 32 DOC's because we can't generate the sorties."?) Anyway - I thought I could do it just like all the rest thought they could . . . and we did for awhile - but now it's too much less, to do too much more -- and a lot of us are tired, and it's not the job. I've been TDY to every dirty little outfit in our democracy's frontier that had a 6000 foot strip. I've been gone longer than most young jocks have been in - and I don't mind the duty or the hours. That's what I signed for. I've been downtown and seen the elephant, and I've watched my buddies roll up in fireballs - I understand - - it comes with the territory. I can do it. I did it then and can still do it, but I won't . . . I'm too tired, not of the job, just the Air Force. Tired of the extremely poor leadership and motivational ability of our senior staffers and commanders. (All those Masters and PME's and not a leadership trait in sight!) Once you get past your squadron CO, people can't even pronounce espirit de corps. (Even a few squadron CO's stumble over it.) And let me clue you -- in the fighter business when you're out of espirit, you're out of corps -- to the tune of 22,000 in the next five years, if you follow the airline projections. And why? Why not? Why hang around in an organization that rewards excellence with no punishment. Ten years in the Air Force, and I've never had a DO or Wing Commander ask me what our combat capability is, or how our exposure times are running during pops, or what our air to air loss and exchange ratios are -- no, a lot of interest in boots, haircuts, scarves, and sleeves rolled down, but zero (well, maybe a query or two on taxi spacing) on my job; not even a passing pat on the ass semiannually. If they're not

interested why should I be so fanatical about it. It ought to be obvious, I'm not in it for the money. I used to believe -- and now they won't even let me do that.

And what about career? Get serious! A String of nine-fours and ones as long as your arm and nobody can guarantee anything. No matter that you are the Air Force expert in subject Y - if the computer spits up your name for slot C - you're gone. One man gets 37 days to report remote - really now, did someone slit his wrists or are we that poor at managing. Another gets a Face-to-Face, no-change-for-six-months-brief from MPC - two weeks later? you got it - orders in his inbasket, I'm ripe to PCS - MPC can't hint where or when, I've been in too long to take the luck of the draw - I've worked hard, I've established myself, I can do the job better than anyone else - does that make a difference? Can I count on progression? No. (At 12 - 15 hours a day on my salary at my age I don't need that insecurity and aggravation.)...And then the big picture - the real reasons we're all pulling the handle - it's the organization itself. A non-competitive training system that allows people in fighter that lack the aptitude or the ability to do the job. Once they're in you can't get them out - not in EFLT, not in RTU and certainly not in an operational squadron. (We have a fighter pilot short fall - didn't you hear?) So now we have lower quality people with motivation problems and the Commander won't allow anyone to jettison them. If you haven't noticed, that leaves us with a lot of people in fighters, but very few fighter pilots - and the ranks of both are thinning; the professionals are dissatisfied and most of the masses weren't that motivated to begin with. MPC helps out by moving Lts every 12 - 15 months or so - that way nobody can get any concentrated training on them before they pull the plug. Result: Operational squadrons aren't worth a damn. They die wholesale everytime the aggressors deploy - anybody keep score? Anybody care? Certainly not the whiz kid commander who blew in from 6 years in staff, picked up 100 hours in the bird and was last seen checking the grass in the sidewalk cracks. He told his boys, "Don't talk to me about tactics - my only concern is not losing an aircraft...and meanwhile, get the grass out of the sidewalk cracks!"...and the clincher - integrity. Hide as much as you can...particularly from the higher headquarters that could help you if only they knew. They never will though - staff will see to that. "Don't say that to the general" or "The general doesn't like to hear that." I didn't know he was paid to like things - I thought he was paid to run things...how can he when he never hears the problem? Ahh, well put if off until it becomes a crisis - maybe it will be overcome by events. Maybe if we ignore it, it won't be a problem. (Shh, don't rock the boat). Meanwhile, lie about the takeoff times, so it isn't an ops or maintenance late. (One more command post to mobile call to ask subtlely if I gave the right time because "ahh, that makes him two minutes late.", and I will puke!) Lie about your DOC capability because you're afraid to report you don't have the sorties to hack it. "Yes, Sir, losing two airplanes won't hurt us at all." The great line. I listened to a three star general look a room-ful of us in the face and say that he, "Did not realize that pencil whipping records was done in the Air Force. Holloman and dive toss was an isolated case, I'm sure." It was embarrassing - that general looked

us in the eye and said, in effect, "Genelemen, either I'm very stupid or I'm lying to you." I about threw in the towel right there. - The day TAC fixed the experience ratio problem, by lowering the number of hours needed to be experienced. And then the final blow, the Commander of TAC arrives - does he ask why the 414 FWS goes 6 for 1 against F-5s and F-15s when his operational outfits run 1 for 7 on a good day? (Will anybody let us volunteer the information?) Does he express interest in why the weapons school hasn't lost an airplane in five years? No - he's impressed with shoe shines and scarves and clean ashtrays. (But then we were graciously allotted only min time to present anything - an indication of our own Wing's support of the program. Party line, no issues, no controversary - yes, sir; no, sir; three bags full, air.)....and that's why I'm resigning - long hours with little support, entitlements eroded, integrity a mockery, zero visible career progression and senior commanders evidently totally missing the point (and everyone afraid or forbidden to inform them). I've had it - life's too short to fight an uphill battle for Commanders and Staffs who won't listen or don't believe, or maybe don't even care. So thanks for the memories, it's been a real slice of life... but I've been to the mountain and looked over and I've seen the big picture - and it wasn't of the Air Force.

"This is your captain speaking...on your left you should be able to see Denver, Colorado, the mil...."

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

TAC AIRCREW CONCERNS CONFERENCE I PARTICIPANTS:

RANK	NAME	LOCATION	POSITION
*Maj	Peter Wolfe	12 AF Bergstrom	12 AF
Maj	Don Kline	TAWC England	TAWC
Capt	Dave Gaw	TFWC Nellis	TFWC
*Capt	James Little	9 AF Shaw	9 AF
Capt	Jack Slagle	552 AWACW Tinker	E-3A Pilot
Capt	Norman McCaslin	11 TDS Davis Monthan	C-130 Pilot
Capt	Donn Kegel	1 SOW Hurlburt	C-130 Pilot
Capt	Jay Van Pelt	414 FWS Nellis	F-4 FWS IP
Capt	Bill Geiger	31 TFW Homestead	F-4 RTU IP
Capt	John Davis	62 TRS Shaw	RF-4 WSO
Capt	Larry Smith	481 TFS Cannon	F-111 RTU IP
Capt	Bill Hogue	389 TFS Mt Home	F-111 Pilot
Capt	David Kirpatrick	27 TFW Cannon	F-111 WSO
Capt	Harry Davis	507 TAIRCW Shaw	O-2 Pilot
Capt	James Reed	549 TASTG Patrick	OV-10 RTU IP
Capt	David Blair	562 TFW George	F-105 WW Pilot
Capt	Gerard Sullivan	Det 1 602 TAIRCW Ft Hood	ALO
Capt	Richard Burroughs	23 TFW England	A-7 Pilot
*Capt	Donald Stuart	465 TFS Holloman	AT-38 IP
Capt	Grady Rockett	64 FWS Nellis	F-5 AGgressor
Capt	Lloyd Hill	333 TFS Davis Monthan	A-7 RTU IP
Capt	John Moore	356 TFS Myrtle Beach	A-10 Pilot
Capt	Robert Evans	461 FTS Luke	F-15 RTU IP
*Capt	Mike Woulf	363 TRW Shaw	RF-4 RTU IP
Capt	Eugene Eastman	1 TFW Langley	F-15 Pilot
*Capt	David Talley	308 TFS Homestead	F-4 RTU IP
Capt	Mark Ordess	474 TFW Nellis	F-4 WSO
*Capt	Ted Oats	63 TFS MacDill	F-4 RTU IP
Capt	Tom Devine	388 TFW Hill	F-4 Pilot
Capt	John Zink	33 TFW Eglin	F-4 Pilot

Col Von Christiansen	366 TFW Mt Home	Commander
Col Stanton Musser	1 TFW Langley	Vice Commander
Col James Davis	388 TFW Hill	Vice Commander

* Indicates those members of the conference who accomplished final editing of the conference report.

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James E. Little, Maj USAF

Maj Joseph R. Bream
US Army Command and General Staff College
Air Force Section
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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